The taking of cognizance of a frivolous charge of contempt may attract liability under Sections 166, 219, 211, 120(B), 34, and 107 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as constitute an offence of civil and/or criminal contempt in its own right. A judge so acting may be liable to compensate the alleged contemnor for violation of his rights. While a contemnor may face punishment of up to six months, a judge passing an order contrary to law may himself face a far graver consequence including sentence up to seven years imprisonment.
[Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala, (2004) 6 SCC 311, Hari Das v. State of W.B., (1964) 7 SCR 237, Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose, (1914) ILR 41 Cal 173, Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad & Tobago, (1978) 2 WLR 902 ; McLeod v. St. Aubyn, [1899] AC 549 ; Walmik Bobde v. State of Maharashtra, 2001 ALL MR (Cri) 1731 Sailajanand Pande v. Suresh Chandra Gupta, 1968 SCC OnLine Pat 49 : AIR 1968 Pat 194, Bharat Devdan Salvi v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 42; S. Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews & Ors., (2018) 10 SCC 804; Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures, In re, (2025) 5 SCC 1; Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, AIR 1994 SC 787; Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 558]
The Court, as protector of the fundamental rights, liberties, and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution, cannot invoke its contempt jurisdiction to silence constructive criticism or public-interest advocacy for judicial reform. The Court must protect not only the speech it favours, but equally the speech it finds unpalatable when directed against itself. Debate on public issues must remain uninhibited, robust, and wide open.
These are binding directions of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court — directions that are, in practice, frequently disregarded by judges in initiating contempt action. Such disregard, itself amounts to civil contempt on the part of the judge so acting, and may further attract liability under Sections 166, 219 and 220 of the Indian Penal Code ( Sections 256 and 257 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita). [Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374; R.S. Tamilvendan v. The Secretary, 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 219; State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639; In Re: S. Mulgaonkar, AIR 1978 SC 727; Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie, (2014) 12 SCC 344; Rama Surat Singh v. Shiv Kumar Pandey, 1969 SCC OnLine All 226; Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association v. R.K. Jain, (2010) 8 SCC 281].
The Hon’ble Apex Court, in its landmark three-judge bench judgment in Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala, (2004) 6 SCC 311, took note of the mischief inherent in the contempt jurisdiction and held that it is, perhaps, the most misinterpreted and misutilised branch of law. The Court observed:
“9. Law of contempt both as regards its interpretation and application had posed complex questions before the court. “No branch of law possibly has been more misconstrued or misutilised within the contempt jurisdiction”, observed Lord Denning. The contempt jurisdiction originates from the Ecclesiastical Courts which goes back to the middle ages while ethics and law were treated to be at par.
“13. Summary power of punishing for contempt is used sparingly and only in serious cases. Such a power a court must of necessity possess but its usefulness would depend upon the wisdom and restraint with which it is exercised. It is not used to suppress methods of advocacy. (See Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v. R. [1945 AC 264 : 114 LJPC 95 : 173 LT 400 (PC)] , AC at p. 270.)”
Judicial accountability requires both internal and external checks. Criticism, debate, and reform are constitutionally protected, and stand on equal footing with internal mechanisms such as appeal and review. Contempt jurisdiction is not a shield for hypersensitive judges to protect their feelings, nor a means of covering the misdeeds or incapacity of the judges being criticized. The taking of cognizance of contempt should not create an obstruction to the people’s right to make complaints or criticism, however outspoken, against judges. Fair criticism based on fact does not amount to contempt of court, even where the truth revealed, or the criticism made, is such as to deprive the Court or a judge of public confidence. Ultimately, even the judges of the highest court remain answerable before the court of the people — the final and most enduring court of democracy. The courts are not fragile flowers that will wither in the hot heat of controversy. They need not fear criticism nor need they seek to sustain unnecessary barriers to complaints about their operations or decisions If judges decay, the contempt power will not save them. The key consideration in invoking contempt jurisdiction is that it must serve the protection of “justice,” not the “judge”; It should be used for securing unobstructed public justice, not for the self-defence of a judge. The law of contempt therefore represents a careful constitutional accommodation between two equally important values — the freedom of speech and expression on the one hand, and the independence and effective functioning of the judiciary on the other.
It is a well-settled constitutional principle, repeatedly affirmed by Constitution Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that the Courts are the ultimate guardians of the fundamental rights, liberties and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. Being the protector and vindicator of citizens’ rights, the Court cannot itself become the source of their violation. Consequently, no Court can exercise any jurisdiction, including contempt jurisdiction, in a manner that unreasonably curtails the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a), violates the guarantees of fairness under Articles 14 and 21, or creates even a reasonable apprehension of bias.
In Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374, the Constitution Bench emphasized that contempt jurisdiction is an extraordinary jurisdiction which must be exercised with scrupulous care, restraint and caution. The Court observed that, as the guardian of fundamental rights, it would be slow to enforce any law or exercise any jurisdiction in a manner that imposes unreasonable restrictions upon the cherished freedom of speech and expression. The object of contempt law is to protect the administration of justice and not to shield judges or courts from fair, bona fide and constructive criticism.
The judicial observations in Regina V/s. Kopyto, [1987] O.J. No. 1052; (1987) 39 CCC (3d) 1, offer one of the clearest articulations of the re lationship between freedom of speech and the evolving nature of truth in democratic societies. They serve as a powerful reminder that freedom of expression is not merely a statutory right — it is a safeguard against the tyranny of assumed infallibility, particularly in institutions entrusted with the administration of justice.
Truth is not static. Every generation must retain the freedom to question what the previous generation accepted as gospel, for, as has been observed:
“Every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd; and it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will be rejected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.”
The same constitutional principle was reiterated by the Madras High Court in R.S. Tamilvendan v. The Secretary, 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 219, wherein the Court observed that when citizens approach the Court seeking protection against infringement of their liberties, the Court itself cannot become the source of injury to those liberties. The Court aptly observed:
“Persons come to Court to protect their freedom and liberty against invasion by the State authorities. It is the Court which stands as the sentinel on the qui vive and it ought not to issue any direction to curtail the freedom of the citizens… We protect not only the words we like but also those that we hate.”
The Courts have consistently held that judges are not above criticism, that judicial institutions derive strength from transparency and public confidence, and that respect for the judiciary cannot be secured by suppressing criticism or dissent. Fair comment, public debate, legal scholarship, investigative journalism and constructive criticism are integral facets of a constitutional democracy.
Therefore, since the Court is the ultimate protector of fundamental rights, it cannot adopt a procedure or exercise jurisdiction in a manner that creates an appearance of bias, denies a fair hearing, curtails the right of defence, frustrates statutory or constitutional remedies, or otherwise infringes the guarantees contained in Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Any exercise of contempt jurisdiction inconsistent with these constitutional limitations would stand vitiated.
Constitution bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Baradakanta Mishra V/s. Registrar of Orissa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed:
“88. Even so, if Judges have frailities — after all they are human — they need to be corrected by independent criticism. If the judicature has serious shortcomings which demand systemic correction through socially-oriented reform initiated through constructive criticism, the contempt power should not be an interdict. All this, far from undermining the confidence of the public in Courts, enhances it and, in the last analysis, cannot be repressed by indiscriminate resort to contempt power.
Even bodies like the Law Commission or the Law Institute and researchers, legal and sociological, may run “contempt” risks because their professional work sometimes involves unpleasant criticism of judges, judicial processes and the system itself and thus hover perilously around the periphery of the law if widely construed. Creative legal journalism and activist statesmanship for judicial reform cannot be jeopardised by an undefined apprehension of contempt action.
If judges decay the contempt power will not save them and so the other side of the coin is that judges, like Caesar’s wife, must be above suspicion.
To wind up, the key word is “justice”, not “judge”; the key- note thought is unobstructed public justice, not the self- defence of a judge; the corner-stone of the contempt law is the-accommodation of two constitutional values-the right of free speech and the right to independent justice. The ignition of contempt action should be substantial land mala fide interference with fearless judicial action, not fair comment or trivial reflections on the judicial process and personnel. ”
In In Re: C.S. Karnan (2017) 7 SCC 1, the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, relying on the decision in In Re, (2008) 1 Gau LT 800, laid down the binding principle that allegations attributing motives, personal interest, bias, predisposition, or extraneous influence to a judge in the rendering of a judicial verdict may be entertained only when such allegations are substantiated by concrete and cogent material establishing them as existing facts. Only when they are unsubstatiated and without proofs they comes under actionable contempt.
It is ruled as under;
“63. The authority to punish for contempt of court has always been exercised by the judiciary from times.[…] ….. . The justification for the existence of that is not to afford protection to individual Judges [ “14. … the law of contempt is not made for the protection of Judges who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.” [Douglas, J., Craig v. Harney, 1947 SCC OnLine US SC 79, para 14 : 91 L Ed 1546 : 331 US 367 at p. 376 (1947)]] but to inspire confidence in the sanctity and efficacy of the judiciary [ “… The object of the discipline enforced by the Court in case of contempt of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the Judge, but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice.” [Bowen, L.J. — Helmore v. Smith (2), (1886) 35 Ch D 449 at p. 455 (CA)]. though they do not and should not flow from the power to punish for contempt. They should rest on more surer foundations. The foundations are—the trust and confidence of the people that the judiciary is fearless and impartial.
70. In a judgment rendered almost a decade back, one of us (Gogoi, J.) sitting in the Gauhati High Court held [Lalit Kalita, In re, (2008) 1 Gau LT 800] :
“14. Judiciary is not oversensitive to criticism; in fact, bona fide criticism is welcome, perhaps, because it opens the doors to self-introspection. Judges are not infallible; they are humans and they often err, though, inadvertently and because of their individual perceptions. In such a situation, fair criticism of the viewpoint expressed in a judicial pronouncement or even of other forms of judicial conduct, is consistent with public interest and public good that Judges are committed to serve and uphold. The system of administration of justice, therefore, would receive due impetus from a realisation amongst Judges that they can or have actually erred in their judgments; another perspective, a new dimension or insight must, therefore, always be welcome. Such a realisation which would really enhance the majesty of the Rule of Law, will only be possible if the doors of self-assessment, in the light of the opinions of others, are kept open by Judges.
***
16. But when should silence cease to remain an option? Where is the line to be drawn? A contemptuous action is punishable on the touchstone of being a wrong to the public as distinguished from the harm caused to the individual Judge. Public confidence in the judicial system is indispensable. Its erosion is fatal. Of course, Judges by their own conduct, action and performance of duties must earn and enjoy the public confidence and not by the application of the rule of contempt. Criticism could be of the underlying principle of a judicial verdict or its rationale or reasoning and even its correctness. Criticism could be of the conduct of an individual Judge or a group of Judges. Whichever manner the criticism is made, it must be dignified in language and content because crude expressions or manifestations are more capable of identification of the alleged wrong with the system as a whole. Motives, personal interest, bias, predisposition, etc. cannot be permitted to be attributed as being responsible for the judicial verdict, unless, of course, the same can be established as an existing fact. It is the above category of acts or publications that would fall within the prohibited degree warranting action in contempt law.”
Law laid down in In Re: Mulgaonkar (supra) is followed in Vishal Tiwari Vs. Union Of India & ORS, 2025 SCC On Line SC 1057, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court refused to take cognizance of highly scandalous, erroneous and irresponsible allegations against the Supreme Court. In that case, despite the presence of highly scandalous, reckless, and grossly irresponsible allegations made directly against the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India and the Supreme Court as an institution, the Hon’ble Court chose not to take cognizance of contempt, thereby demonstrating judicial restraint and fidelity to constitutional values.
It was alleged, inter alia, that the Chief Justice of India was “responsible for all the civil wars happening in India” and that “in order to incite religious wars in this country, it is only and only the Supreme Court that is responsible.” The Court, while acknowledging that such statements tend to scandalize the authority of the Supreme Court and are likely to interfere with the administration of justice, chose not to invoke its contempt jurisdiction.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further noted that while Sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971—relating to fair criticism and accurate reporting—did not apply in this case, the decision not to initiate contempt was based on the discretionary and restrained nature of the contempt power, as earlier laid down in Mulgaonkar.
The Court emphasized that judges derive their strength not from punitive powers, but from public trust, constitutional morality, and judicial rectitude. It reaffirmed that free speech, open criticism, and public debate are essential elements of democratic discourse, and that courts must remain open to scrutiny, even if such scrutiny is uncomfortable or intemperate at times.
Thus, the judgment in Vishal Tiwari reinforces the enduring doctrine laid down in Mulgaonkar—that the power of contempt must be invoked sparingly, and only when there is a clear and present danger to the administration of justice, not to vindicate personal affronts or institutional ego. Even where scandalous and irresponsible statements are made, judicial institutions are expected to demonstrate restraint, tolerance, and constitutional strength, trusting the maturity of the public to discern truth from provocation.
It is ruled as under:
“ 4. We have examined the contents of the assertions made by respondent no. 4, which no doubt tend to scandalize and lower the authority of the Supreme Court of India, if not interfere or tend to interfere with the judicial proceedings pending before this Court, and have the tendency to interfere and obstruct the administration of justice. The statements made reflect the clear intent to impute motives to the Bench itself by naming the Chief Justice of India as “responsible for all the civil wars happening in India” and “in order to incite religious wars in this country, it is only and only the Supreme Court that is responsible”.
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act carve out exceptions which, prima facie, are not attracted. There is no ‘civil war’ in India.
6. We, therefore, refrain from taking any action. This Court in, In Re: S. Mulgaonkar, AIR 1978 SC 727, observed that the judiciary is not immune from criticism, but when criticism is an obvious distortion or a gross misstatement, which is made in a manner designed to lower the respect of the judiciary and destroy public confidence, it should not be ignored. However, the power to initiate contempt is discretionary in its unsheathed exercise. Every commission of contempt need not erupt in an indignant committal or levy of punishment, however deserving it may actually be. It is so because judges are judicious, their valour non-violent and their wisdom springs into action when played upon by a volley of values, the least of which is personal protection. Courts believe in values like free press, fair trial, judicial fearlessness and community confidence. Thus, courts need not protect their verdicts and decisions by taking recourse to the power of contempt. Surely, courts and judges have shoulders broad enough and an implicit trust that the people would perceive and recognize when criticism or critique is biased, scandalous and ill-intentioned.
8. In the course of dispensation of justice, courts draw inspiration from consecrated principles. The judiciary, as an institution, is accountable to the people through various mechanisms. Arguments take place in open court. Decisions and judgments are reasoned. Judicial procedure ensures transparency and accountability. Judgments are put to scrutiny and critique. Decisions are debated and if required, corrected by exercise of right of appeal, review, in curative jurisdiction and by reference to a larger bench. The judiciary’s legitimacy and credibility are rooted in public trust and are maintained through fair, impartial and transparent decision-making.
The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C.S. Karnan, In re, (2017) 2 SCC 756, has laid down a foundational and binding principle concerning the true scope and purpose of the contempt jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India. The Court emphatically clarified that the law of contempt is not intended to protect judges from discomfort arising out of public opinion or criticism, nor is it meant to vindicate the personal dignity or prestige of an individual judge.
In R.S. Tamilvendan v. The Secretary, 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 219, while illustrating this constitutional principle through a passage from the Ramayana, it was observed as under:
“One more legal proposition may have to be laid down. Before we do so, we will quote a story from Ramayana. After a tiring day trekking in the forest, Lord Rama chose a resting place. He dropped his bow and arrows on the ground. When he woke up the next morning, he found that one of his arrows had fatally pierced a frog. The frog was about to breathe its last. The anguished Rama asked the frog as to why it did not raise an alarm. The innocent frog replied, ‘When others hurt me, I call your name — Rama Rama! But when you are the source of trouble, who else can I call?’ Persons come to Court to protect their freedom and liberty against invasion by the State authorities. It is the Court which stands as the sentinel on the qui vive and it ought not to issue any direction to curtail the freedom of the citizens. As long as the portrayal or writing or expression does not attract any of the restrictions recognised by law, it is the duty of the Court to protect. We protect not only the words we like but also those that we hate.”
“Judges need not be treated as holy cows. Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, though outspoken, comments of ordinary men.” — Lord Atkin
“Judicial institutions are, and should be made of stronger stuff. Debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open. They may include vehement, sarcastic and sometimes unpleasant criticism of public officials.” [D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216]
“Judges are not above criticism.”
In Foundation for Media Professionals v. ANI Media Pvt. Ltd., (2025) 10 SCC 353, it was observed that Courts should welcome debate and constructive criticism. In a democracy, it is not necessary that everyone should sing the same song and freedom of expression remains the rule. [S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574]
Justice Black long ago dispelled the assumption that respect for the judiciary can be secured by shielding judges from public criticism. An enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the Bench, would probably generate resentment, suspicion and contempt far more than it would enhance respect. [Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252]
Supreme Court’s View on Trial of Judges before the People’s Court:
The Full bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in In Re: S. Mulgaonkar, AIR 1978 SC 727, clearly recognised that at critical moments, courts themselves are subject to scrutiny by the people, observing that the ultimate verdict on all institutions lies with “We, the People of India.” This affirms that judicial legitimacy flows from public confidence and constitutional morality.
Further, in State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639, the Hon’ble Court reiterated that open hearings, reasoned judgments, and public critique are not only permissible but are integral and legally protected features of a democratic system. Such external scrutiny is equally important as that of appeals and reviews as a vital safeguard against arbitrariness, error, and injustice, thereby ensuring judicial accountability.
In In Re: S. Mulgaonkar, AIR 1978 SC 727, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reminded judges that when judicial conduct, judicial decisions, or the functioning of the institution itself become subjects of public debate and criticism, courts must respond with restraint, humility, and constitutional tolerance. The Court recognized that, in such situations, it is not merely the critic who stands judged; rather, the judiciary itself comes under public scrutiny and is, in a sense, placed on trial before the highest constitutional forum in a democracy—the court of public opinion constituted by “We, the People of India.” It is ultimately the people who assess the performance, credibility, and moral authority of all constitutional institutions, including the judiciary. Emphasizing this constitutional reality, the Court observed: “
“ Christ and Gandhi shall not be lost on the judges at a critical time when courts are on trial and the people (“We, the People of India”) pronounce the final verdict on all national institutions. ”
In State of M.P. V/s. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639, it is ruled by the Full bench as under;
“70. In Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, In re [(1995) 3 SCC 619] this Court observed : (SCC p. 629, para 10)
“10. … None is free from errors, and the judiciary does not claim infallibility. It is truly said that a judge who has not committed a mistake is yet to be born. Our legal system in fact acknowledges the fallibility of the courts and provides for both internal and external checks to correct the errors. The law, the jurisprudence and the precedents, the open public hearings, reasoned judgments, appeals, revisions, references and reviews constitute the internal checks while objective critiques, debates and discussions of judgments outside the courts, and legislative correctives provide the external checks. Together, they go a long way to ensure judicial accountability. The law thus provides procedure to correct judicial errors.”
The most critical portion of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court’s ruling in Rama Surat Singh v. Shiv Kumar Pandey, 1969 SCC OnLine All 226—namely, the rhetorical remark:
“…or it is unthinkable that a judicial officer should be allowed to take bribes and if anybody makes a grievance of the matter to the higher authorities, he should be hauled up for contempt of Court.”
—serves as a powerful judicial warning against the misuse of contempt jurisdiction to intimidate or punish citizens who raise bona fide allegations of judicial corruption. The language of the Court is framed in rhetorical form precisely to underscore the absurdity and unconstitutionality of punishing a citizen who performs their civic and constitutional duty of reporting corruption through proper legal channels.
Hon’ble Constitution Bench in the case of Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie, (2014) 12 SCC 344 , it is ruled as under;
12. In Wills [Nationwide News (Pty) Ltd. v. Wills, (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Aust)] the High Court of Australia suggested that truth could be a defence if the comment was also for the public benefit. It said, “… The revelation of truth—at all events when its revelation is for the public benefit—and the making of a fair criticism based on fact do not amount to a contempt of court though the truth revealed or the criticism made is such as to deprive the court or Judge of public confidence…”
In Court on its Own Motion Vs. Ram Piara Comrade1972 SCC OnLine P & H 277 it is ruled as under;
“ 12. The very idea of a complaint has inherent in it that the person complaining is levelling some sort of accusations. The complaint for which there is a lawful justification is not per se a publication unless it is a garbled version falsifying the issues raised in the complaint so as to negative any good faith.
12. The order is as stated above so patently illegal that the suspicion of the respondent mentioned in his complaints to the Chief Justice that the Judicial Officer might have acted with a corrupt motive or for any other extraneous reason could not be totally ruled out as baseless so as to justify a conclusion by us that the respondent did not act honestly and intended only to scandalize the Court of Shri Lamba.
12. For the exercise of power of punishing a contemner the vehemence of the language used in the offending publications concerning a judge is not the only criterion. While punishing a contemner is in the interest of the society, it is equally necessary in order to protect that interest in a democratic set up that a citizen should be allowed to make a complaint to the High Court about a subordinate Judicial Officer so long as the complaint is made in good faith as the Constitution vests in the High Court full and complete administrative and disciplinary control over subordinate judiciary in the State. In order to have a proper control and check over the judiciary, it is but expedient that a citizen is not dissuaded by the threat of prosecution for contempt from making a bona fide complaint to the High Court against the Presiding Officer of a Subordinate Court.
13. The act of the respondent in making complaints to the Chief Justice of this Court against Shri Lamba and sending copies of the same to the Governor and the Chief Minister, who are admittedly the appointing authorities;’ though disciplinary control is with the High Court, is covered by Section 6 of the Act and does not amount to a publication tending to scandalize the Court of Shri Lamba within the meaning of Section 2(c). The mere fact that copies were sent to the Chief Justice of India who too is believed to be having supervisory control over the judiciary in India does not in any way in the instant case amount to publication within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act.
14. In the result, the rule issued against the respondent is discharged with no order as to costs.
Further, in S.R. Ramaraj v. Special Court, Bombay, (2003) 7 SCC 175, the Hon’ble Supreme Court once again reiterated that the mere fact that a pleading appears aggressive or may constitute an abuse of process does not ipso facto attract contempt jurisdiction, unless the facts pleaded are themselves false or constitute an attempt to deceive the court.
It was observed:
“ […] 9. Merely because an action or defence can be an abuse of process of the court, those responsible for its formulation cannot be regarded as committing contempt, but an attempt to deceive the court by disguising the nature of a claim is contempt.
If the facts leading to a claim or defence are set out, but an inference is drawn thereby stating that the stand of the plaintiff or defendant is one way or the other it will not amount to contempt unless it be that the facts as pleaded themselves are false. ”
In Regina V/s. Kopyto, [1987] O.J. No. 1052; (1987) 39 CCC (3d) 1, a judgment that has been internationally recognized as a model articulation of the relationship between free speech and judicial accountability in democratic societies.
In the said case, the court set aside the conviction and ruled as under:
“The allegations that the Courts are biased may be contemptuous but such opinion cannot be charged because they are protected by the freedom of expression. Even if they are scandalous they cannot be punished unless any evidence led to prove that they lead to create danger to the fair & effective administration of justice.”
(Regina V/s. Kopyto, 1987)
Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374, ruled as under;
“Similarly, in Rex.. v. R. S. Nayyar, “ A.I.R. 1950 All. 549: 554 the court considered a representation made to the Premier of the State about a judicial officer and also to the President of the All India Congress Committee. The Court took the view that such complaints may be addressed to the Premier about judicial officers since Government had to consider under the then rules the conduct of judicial personnel.
[..] A pregnant observation made by the Court deserves mention “It would indeed be extraordinary if the law should provide a remedy- the conduct of even a member of the highest Judicial Tribunal in the exercise of his judicial office may be the subject of enquiry with a view to see whether he is fit to continue to hold that office-and yet no one should be able to initiate proceedings for an enquiry by a complaint to the appropriate authority by reason of a fear of being punished for contempt, and I can find no justification for this view.”
In Rama Surat Singh Vs. Shiv Kumar Pandey 1969 SCC OnLine All 226, it is ruled as
under;
“12. On the other hand, if a particular judge or magistrate is corrupt and sells justice, then a bona fide complaint to higher authorities to take necessary action against the delinquent judicial officer is again to maintain the self-same purity of the administration of justice, for it is unthinkable that a judicial officer should be allowed to take bribes and if anybody makes a grievance of the matter to the higher authorities, he should be hauled up for contempt of Court.
33. For all the above reasons and in the light of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court and interpreted by this Court these opposite parties should not be prosecuted for contempt, particularly when the allegations of corruption made by the first opposite party (Shiv Kumar Pandey) against the applicant are still under investigation and it cannot be said, at this stage that they were either untrue or mala fide.
13. On the one hand it is of the utmost importance for the pure administration of justice that the Courts should be free from such attacks as are derogatory to them, for these aspersions on the Courts are likely to undermine the confidence of the public at large in the impartial administration of justice, On the other hand, it does not mean that if a Magistrate or judge acts dishonestly or is corrupt then too, he is beyond the reach of law and can take protection under the threat of prosecuting those who bona fide raise their voice against him. If the raising of a charge of bribery against a judge is contempt of Court, then would his prosecution also amount to contempt or could it be said that even the Court which tries him for an offence under Section 161, I. P. C. or under Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is guilty of contempt of Court ?
There may appear some sort of inconsistency between these two principles. But the two conflicting rules of law have got to be reconciled. It was under the distress of the above seemingly conflicting rules of law and the somewhat Irreconcilable conclusions arrived at by various Courts that our learned brother Katju. J. referred the following three questions for consideration by a larger Bench:–
“(1) Whether the communication addressed by opposite party No. 1 to the Home Minister (Annexure ‘A’ to the supplementary affidavit of opposite party No. 12) constitutes contempt of court and opposite party No. 1 is liable to be punished for contempt of court?
(2) Whether the statements made by opposite parties Beni Madho, Ganga Prasad, Ram Nawal and Kamta Prasad to Sub Inspector Yadu Pal Singh constitute contempt of court?
(3) Whether opposite party No. 13 in framing charges against the applicant which involved attack on his integrity as a Magistrate while deciding cases had committed contempt of court?”
14. Reference has also been made at the Bar to the following decisions, some of which seem to have laid down conflicting views :– Rex v. Nayyar. AIR 1950 All 549; State v. Brahma Prakash. AIR 1950 All 556 (FB); Brahma Prakash v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shyam Sunder Lal. AIR 1954 All 308; Tukaram G. Gaokar v. R. N. Shukla. AIR 1968 SC 1050; Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath, AIR 1969 SC 30.
15. Before dealing With the above authorities, we think it necessary to point out that the object of the law of contempt is not to vindicate the prestige or position of a presiding officer of a Court, for which the proper remedy is an action in libel or defamation by the officer concerned, but to maintain the continuity of the crystal clear flow of the stream of justice by sustaining the confidence of the public at large in the fair administration of justice. Secondly, we may point out that it is a discretionary and summary remedy which may be taken recourse to only in suitable cases. And thirdly, it has to be remembered that the observations made in a ruling are with reference to the facts and circumstances of that particular case.
16. In Ambard v. Attorney Gene ral for Trinidad, 1936 AC 322 at page 355 = (AIR 1936 PC 141 at p. 146) Lord Atkin made his famous observation that “Justice is not a cloistered virtue. She must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men”.
17. In his report to the Committee of International Jurists 1959 Lord Shaw Cross at page 15 desired a more progressive view when he stated:–
“…. Clearly if someone wishes in good faith to make a charge of partiality or corruption against Judge he ought to have the opportunity of making it: ……. We consider that he should be able to do so by letter to the Lord Chancellor or to his Member of Parliament without fear of punishment and would deplore the use of the law of contempt to prevent him from doing so. The charges could then be considered either administratively or in the House of Commons or in the House of Lords.”
18. Likewise, in Mcleod v. St. Aubyn. 1899 AC 549 Lord Morris, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, observed:–
“The power summarily to commit for contempt is considered necessary for the proper administration of justice. It is not to be used for the vindication of a Judge as a person. He must resort to action for libel or criminal information.”
23. There can be no doubt that while hostile comments on judicial proceedings which are pending may have an adverse influence on the proceedings themselves as well as on the litigants and Courts involved therein, the same cannot be said with regard to comments or reflections on the judicial proceedings, after they have been finally disposed of and the presiding officer has also retired. Once this stage is reached, the “judge, in Bentham’s phrase, is given over to criticism’ and public interest demands that no undue fetters should be placed upon the rights of individuals to reflect on the conduct of the Judge or the parties in the proceedings or to comment upon the decisions in those proceedings.
Apart from anything else, such criticism would act as a necessary corrective to the judiciary. The right to criticise judicial conduct and judicial decisions in relation to proceedings which are no longer pending cannot, however be of an absolute character but when kept within proper bounds, it is bound to serve a very useful purpose.
24. This view finds support from the weighty observations made by the Supreme Court on more than one occasion. In the case of Brahma Prakash AIR 1954 SC 10 (supra), Mukherjea, J. made it very clear that the reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism, which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice and that it is not by stifling criticism that confidence in Courts can be created.
34. To us it further appears that the instant application for taking proceedings in contempt against various opposite parties is not bona fide, inasmuch as it was filed (a) long after the applicant had ceased to be a Magistrate, (b) long after the impugned cases stood finally decided, (c) about four months after the applicant was served with a charge-sheet in respect of his alleged misconduct and (d) this contempt application appears to have been moved by way of counter-blast to the administrative enquiry pending against the applicant for his alleged misconduct and corruption. This fact is evident from the applicant’s anxiety to obtain a restraint order from this Court against opposite party No. 13, prohibiting him from proceeding further with the administrative enquiry pending against him. In fact, he succeeded in obtaining a interim order to the above effect from the High Court on 22-5-19(58.
35. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, our answers to the questions referred to us are as under:–
(1) The communication addressed by opposite party No. 1 to the Home Minister (Annexure ‘A’ to the supplementary affidavit of opposite party No. 12) floes not constitute’ contempt of Court and opposite party No. 1 is not liable to be punished for contempt of Court.
(2) The statements made by opposite parties Boni Madho, Ganga Prasad, Ram Nawal and Kamta Prasad to Sub-Inspector Yadupal Singh do not constitute contempt of court.
(3) Opposite party No. 13 (Syed Sibte Hasan Rizvi, Member Administrative Tribunal, U. P.) is also not guilty of contempt of court, when he framed charges against the applicant, which involved an attack on his integrity as a Magistrate while deciding cases.”
