It has been unequivocally ruled that non-adherence by Judges of all Courts—including High Courts—to binding Supreme Court precedents amounts to contempt of the Supreme Court. Judges who fail to follow binding precedents of larger Benches are guilty of civil contempt under Sections 2(b), 12, and 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and no consent of the Attorney General is required for such civil contempt proceedings. [Rabindra Nath Singh v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav, (2010) 6 SCC 417; Spencer & Co. Ltd. v. Vishwadarshan Distributors (P) Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 259; and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Prominent Hotels (P) Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 11910. ]
All contrary views stand overruled, and any later deviation by smaller Benches—including the view attributed to the two-Judge Bench of Justice B. V. Nagarathna reported in the Times of India—are per incuriam and non-binding.
The Supreme Court has also ruled that the Court Registry cannot reject or question the maintainability of contempt petitions filed against Judges.
New Delhi :- The Supreme Court, in its recent decisions, has taken an exceptionally strict and uncompromising view against Judges who attempt to evade or dilute binding Supreme Court precedents. The Court has noted with concern that certain Judges employ various improper methods—such as ignoring binding judgments, offering whimsical or illogical reasoning, or giving superficial “distinguishing” observations without identifying or discussing the ratio decidendi—to justify orders contrary to settled law.
The Supreme Court has categorically held that such conduct amounts to nothing more than a “show of reasoning,” intended to create the false impression that judicial discretion has been exercised on legal grounds, whereas in reality no genuine reasoning has been provided. This misuse of discretion, the Court emphasized, constitutes a serious breach of judicial discipline.
The Apex Court reiterated that when Judges fail to follow binding precedents or attempt to bypass them through artificial distinctions or cosmetic reasoning, they undermine the certainty, consistency, and predictability of law—core pillars of the Indian judicial system—and bring disrepute to the entire judiciary.
- Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1; and
- Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, (2025) 3 SCC 95
that the tendency of some Judges to avoid binding precedents by pointing out minor or trivial factual distinctions is wholly impermissible. Such conduct reflects disrespect to the constitutional ethos and constitutes a serious breach of judicial discipline.
A warning on credibility and chance litigation
The Court observed that deviations of this kind:
- seriously undermine the credibility of the judicial institution,
- disrupt the uniform development of law, and
- promote chance litigation—directly harming the rule of law.
The Bench noted that predictability and certainty are the hallmarks of Indian judicial jurisprudence evolved over the last six decades. Conflicting judgments of superior courts cause incalculable harm, generating uncertainty and confusion among litigants, lawyers, and authorities alike.
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF JUDGES:- The judgment underscores that those entrusted with administering the judicial system—and who take an oath to uphold the Constitution—must exemplify the highest commitment to constitutional principles and judicial discipline. This burden is especially weighty for Judges, who wield the power to decide critical constitutional and legal issues and who serve as guardians of individual and societal rights.
A constitutional reminder from the Supreme Court
“Discipline is the sine qua non for the effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. If Courts command others to follow the Constitution and the rule of law, they cannot themselves violate constitutional discipline.”
It is further ruled that Judges owe an institutional duty to uphold the certainty, stability, and predictability of law. Judicial decisions must therefore be anchored in established legal principles, and courts are expected to justify their conclusions by applying the settled doctrines laid down by binding precedent.
The doctrine of stare decisis is a foundational pillar of the Indian judicial system. It ensures uniformity, consistency, and coherence in the development of legal principles. A consistent body of judicial precedent reinforces public confidence in the justice-delivery system and preserves the rule of law.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has emphasized that there must be consistency in the annunciation of legal principles in its decisions, and that judicial discipline demands faithful adherence to binding precedent. Any deviation not only disrupts the harmony of legal doctrine but also undermines the credibility of the institution and the certainty expected by litigants and the public at large.
It is a settled principle of law that a decision rendered by a co-ordinate Bench is binding on subsequent Benches of equal or lesser strength. No Bench of the same strength can overrule or disregard a co-ordinate Bench decision; at best, it may refer the matter to a larger Bench if it disagrees.
Thus, any decision rendered in ignorance of a prior binding judgment of the same Court, or of a Court of coordinate or higher jurisdiction, or in ignorance of a statutory provision or a rule having the force of law, is classified as per incuriam. A per incuriam ruling carries no precedential authority. Such a decision cannot be regarded as laying down “good law,” even if it has not been expressly overruled.
A decision rendered per incuriam loses all precedential value. Such a ruling is not binding as a judicial precedent. All the authorities are fully entitled to disagree with and decline to follow a per incuriam decision, and a larger Bench can expressly overrule it.
ACTION PROVIDED AGAINST JUDGES REFUSING TO FOLLOW THE BINDING PRECEDENTS
The law is unequivocally settled by larger Benches of the Supreme Court, including several Constitution Benches, that Judges who neglect, omit, or refuse to apply the law and ratio laid down by the Supreme Court betray the constitutional trust reposed in them by the nation. Every Judge is duty-bound to consider the binding precedents relied upon by the parties, identify and examine the ratio decidendi, and—if inclined to take a different view—assign cogent, reasoned, and intelligible grounds for non-acceptance.
Mechanical or “rubber-stamp” reasons, superficial observations, pretence of consideration, or pretence of reasons or mere name-sake reference to binding precedents—followed by a contrary view based on minor, artificial, or irrelevant factual distinctions—do not satisfy this constitutional obligation. Such conduct has been expressly held to constitute judicial adventurism, perversity, dishonesty, and even contempt of the Supreme Court.
It is also firmly settled that when a Judge proposes to rely upon any judgment, ratio, or legal proposition suo motu—that is, not cited by the parties—the Court is constitutionally and procedurally bound to give the parties and their advocates a fair opportunity to address, explain, or rebut the said legal position.
Failure to afford such an opportunity renders the decision vitiated, being in violation of the principles of natural justice, including the fundamental rule of audi alteram partem.
Such an order becomes liable to be recalled, reviewed, or set aside, as reliance on an uncited or undisclosed authority without hearing the parties constitutes a denial of fair hearing and an abuse of judicial process.
Where this mandatory procedure is not followed, the Judge’s deliberate disregard of binding precedent amounts to a breach of the judicial oath, a violation of Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution, and a serious disservice to the judicial institution and to the litigants for whose benefit the system exists. Such conduct brings disrepute upon the entire judiciary and strikes at the very foundation of the administration of justice.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that judicial authority is not a personal prerogative but a constitutional trust, to be exercised strictly within the framework of Articles 141 and 144 of the Constitution, which mandate every court and every authority to act in conformity with the law declared by the Supreme Court and to aid its enforcement.
It is firmly settled that Judges who pass orders contrary to binding precedents are liable for both contempt proceedings and departmental disciplinary action. Judges are bound to apply the correct law and must not pass orders contrary to binding precedents even if such precedents are not cited by the parties.
A Judge who passes an order in disregard of even general guidelines issued by the Supreme Court is equally guilty of contempt. A Judge cannot take the defence that he or she was unaware of binding precedents or directions of the Supreme Court; ignorance of the law is no defence even for a judicial officer.
Such conduct has been judicially characterized as:
· “judicial adventurism”
· “acting with corrupt motive”
· “legal malice”
· “perversity”
· “judicial dishonesty”
· “fraud on power”
· “misuse of discretion”
Departmental actions—including suspension, dismissal, and compulsory retirement—have been repeatedly upheld on this ground, with courts observing that a Judge’s poor understanding of law or improper conduct has a “rippling effect” on the entire judicial system and gravely harms litigants.
In numerous cases, criminal prosecution has been directed against Judges who have misused judicial power to confer illegal benefits upon undeserving individuals through corrupt or improper means. The Indian Penal Code contains specific penal provisions applicable to dishonest or corrupt Judges who wilfully defy the mandates of law and pass unlawful, mala fide, or jurisdictionally perverse orders.
Importantly, such criminal proceedings are maintainable irrespective of whether the impugned judicial order is challenged separately or not, as both remedies operate in distinct and independent legal spheres.
The relevant penal provisions attracted against Judges passing orders contrary to law include:
Sections 166, 167, 192, 193, 218, 219, 220, 465, 466, 409, 120B, 34, 109 IPC,
along with their corresponding provisions under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).
Further, any misuse or abuse of judicial authority to extend an “undue favour” to an accused or any other person squarely invites Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, which penalizes any person who obtains or attempts to obtain an “undue advantage” for themselves or for another, through corrupt or illegal means, or by using personal influence to improperly influence the performance of a public servant’s official duty. The statutory punishment is imprisonment for not less than three years, extendable up to seven years, along with a fine.
(i) Ratilal Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 298,
(ii) Rohan Vijay Nahar Vs. State 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2366,
(iii) State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 ;
(iv) Harish Arora vs The Dy. Registrar 2025 SCC On Line Bom 2853;
(v) Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian, (1976) 3 SCC 677
(vi) Pradip J. Mehta v. CIT, (2008) 14 SCC 283
(vii) Dattani and Co. v. Income Tax Officer, 2013 SCC OnLine Guj 8841
(viii) Yogesh Waman Athavale v. Vikram Abasaheb Jadhav, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 3443
(ix) Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand (2008) 10 SCC 1
(x) U.P. Education for All Project Board v. Saroj Maurya, (2024) 12 SCC 609
(xi) Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401;
(xii) Som Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 574,
(xiii) Emkay Exports, Mumbai v. Madhusudan Shrikrishna, 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 598
(xiv) Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Tap Aria, 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 755
(xv) K. Rama Reddy Vs State 1998 (3) ALD 305,
(xvi) Jayant Verma Vs. Union of India (2018) 4 SCC 743
(xvii) R.R. Parekh Vs. High Court of Gujrat (2016) 14 SCC 1,
(xviii) Vijay Shekhar v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 666,
(xix) Umesh Chandra Vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 2006 (5) AWC 4519 ALL;
(xx) K. Veeraswami Vs. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 655 (Five-J);
(xxi) Raman Lal Vs. State 2001 Cri. L. J. 800;
(xxii) Re: C. S. Karnan (2017) 7 SCC 1;
(xxiii) Govind Mehta Vs. State of Bihar (1971) 3 SCC 329,
(xxiv) Mohd. Nazer M.P. v. State (UT of Lakshadweep), 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 7434,
(xxv) Jagat Jagdishchandra Patel Vs. State of Gujrat 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 4517;
On reasoned order :-
(i) Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315;
(ii) Vishal Ashwin Patel v. CIT, (2022) 14 SCC 817;
(iii) Shailesh Bhansali v. Alok Dhir, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 512;
(iv) Hakim Nazir Ahmad v. Commissioner, 2025 SCC OnLine J&K ___,
(v) Johra v. State of Haryan a, (2019) 2 SCC 324;
(vi) U.P. Education for All Project Board v. Saroj Maurya, (2024) 12 SCC 609;
(vii) P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. v. Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1183;
(viii) Delta Foundations v. KSCC Ltd., (2003) 4 ICC 251 (Ker) (DB)
Worst Kind of Judicial Dishonesty and Corruption — Fraud on Power
The conduct of the accused Judges, in knowingly and deliberately violating constitutional and statutory safeguards, by acting in defiance of binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and relying upon irrelevant, inapplicable, or overruled judgments, constitutes the worst kind of judicial dishonesty, corruption, and abuse of judicial power.
Such conduct strikes at the very root of the administration of justice, shakes public faith in the judiciary, and amounts to a “fraud on power” — a doctrine repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court of India as rendering any judicial or administrative act null, void, and non est in law.
In Muzaffar Husain v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 567, the Supreme Court strongly deprecated such conduct and described it as “the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct, destructive of public confidence in the justice system.” The Court emphasized that judges who indulge in such acts are unfit to continue in judicial office and must be removed or dismissed to preserve the integrity of the institution.
Similarly, in Kamisetty Pedda Venkata Subbamma v. Chinna Kummagandla Venkataiah, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 1009, the High Court unequivocally held that a judge who passes an order by ignoring the written pleadings, arguments or evidence on record is guilty of judicial dishonesty. The Court cautioned that “if such things were to happen, the litigant public would certainly lose faith in the judicial system.” This observation underscores the constitutional duty of every judicial officer to act within the confines of the record and law, and not to substitute personal opinion or bias for judicial reasoning.
Further, the Full Bench of the Supreme Court in Vijay Shekhar v. Union of India, (2004) SCC 666, laid down that even in the absence of any proven motive, if a judicial order is passed by deliberately ignoring material evidence on record or by considering extraneous or irrelevant materials, such conduct constitutes fraud on power, rendering the order vitiated, unconstitutional, and void ab initio. The Court clarified that such misuse of judicial discretion amounts to a subversion of justice, and the concerned judge is personally accountable for such fraudulent exercise of power.
The cumulative effect of these authoritative pronouncements leaves no room for doubt — when judges act in blatant disregard of law, precedent, and record, their acts cease to be judicial acts and fall within the realm of malfeasance in public office. Such misconduct not only destroys the sanctity of judicial office but also warrants disciplinary, criminal, and constitutional action, including prosecution and recovery of damages, to restore public faith in the judiciary and uphold the majesty of the law.
Similarly, in R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat, (2016) 14 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically held that when a Judge acts in conscious violation of statutory provisions or binding law, such conduct is ipso facto actuated by corrupt motive, and no separate proof of mens rea or motive is required. The Court observed that the very passing of an order contrary to law is itself sufficient proof of mala fides and corruption, since a Judge is presumed to be aware of the law. The act of knowingly disobeying statutory mandates or constitutional obligations, therefore, constitutes judicial corruption and misconduct, undermining the integrity of the judicial institution and attracting both criminal and disciplinary consequences.
Supreme Court hold that its Registry cannot refuse to register the contempt petition against judges. The decision about maintainability can be taken on judicial side by the court.
The appeal MA No. 1813/2020 was admitted by a three-Judge Bench on 13.01.2025, whereupon contempt notices were issued to Mumbai Judge A.P. Khanorkar, who subsequently tendered an unconditional apology.
While disposing of the appeal, the Supreme Court on 2nd December 2021 held that the Appellant was correct in challenging the Registry’s refusal to file his contempt petition. It makes it clear that the Registry had acted beyond its jurisdiction, as questions of maintainability lie exclusively on the judicial side, and the Registry cannot reject or refuse to register a contempt petition on the ground of maintainability.
View taken by the Two Judge Bench of Justice B. V. Nagartna is against the binding precedents of constitution benches and hence per incuriam and non binding.
The view reportedly taken by the two-Judge Bench headed by Justice B. V. Nagarathna stands in direct conflict with binding Constitution Bench precedents of the Supreme Court and is therefore per incuriam and non-binding in law.
A news report published in The Times of India on 18.11.2025 stated that the Bench headed by Justice Nagarathna had imposed a fine on a petitioner for filing a contempt petition against a Judge. The detailed order is not yet available in the public domain. However, if the view taken by the Bench aligns with the version reported, then such a stance would be unquestionably contrary to established constitutional principles.
In fact, such a view would itself amount to disobedience of binding judgments of larger and Constitution Benches—particularly those holding that:
· Any citizen may file a contempt petition against a Judge;
· The Supreme Court is bound to examine such petitions on merits;
· No prior consent of the Attorney General is required for civil contempt;
· The Registry cannot reject such petitions on maintainability grounds.
Accordingly, any contrary ruling by a smaller Bench—including the two-Judge Bench of Justice B. V. Nagarathna—cannot have any precedential value, is not required to be followed, and would itself amount to acting in contempt of binding Supreme Court authority.
