List of Binding and Overruled Judgments of the Supreme Court on Contempt of Court

New Delhi: In India, the law relating to contempt of court has long been surrounded by confusion and inconsistency, both in understanding and in its practical application. However, after the pronouncement of judgments in Re: Vijay Kurle, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 407, and Re: Prashant Bhushan, (2021) 3 SCC 160, this confusion has only deepened further, creating uncertainty even among advocates and, at times, within the judiciary itself, regarding the binding nature of precedents and the correct statutory procedure under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Notably, a Three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala, (2004) 6 SCC 311, while quoting Lord Denning, acknowledged that the jurisdiction of contempt is one of the most misused, misconstrued, and misapplied branches of law. A similar view was expressed by the Nine-Judge Bench of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bloom v. State of Illinois, 1968 SCC OnLine US SC 93.

1. Unfortunately, it has been observed that some judges—whether through ignorance or deliberate misuse—have invoked contempt powers for reasons alien to law and justice, thereby causing grave hardship and humiliation to innocent citizens and advocates who dared to assert their rights or express legitimate criticism.

2. In order to clarify the legal position, remove prevailing misconceptions, and guide advocates and litigants on available remedies against injustice or false implication under the law of contempt, the present article is being published. It aims to compile, in one place, the binding and overruled judgments of the Supreme Court on contempt law, along with practical insights for defending against arbitrary or unconstitutional exercise of contempt jurisdiction.

3. Understanding the Law of Precedent — A Foundational Principle: –

3.1 The foremost concept that every advocate—and indeed some judges—must clearly understand is the law of precedent, which forms the bedrock of judicial discipline and constitutional adjudication in India. The settled principles may be summarized as follows:

(i) Binding Force of Larger and Co-Equal Benches

The judgment rendered by a larger Bench or a co-equal Bench is binding, and any contrary view taken by a smaller Bench has no binding force, even if such smaller-Bench decision has not been expressly overruled. It is to be treated as impliedly overruled once a larger Bench has laid down a different or contrary view.

Authorities: Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1; C.N. Rudramurthy v. K. Barkathulla Khan, (1998) 8 SCC 275 ; S.E. Graphites (P) Ltd. v. State of Telangana, (2020) 14 SCC 521

(ii) Conflicting Decisions of Co-Equal Benches

Where there exist two conflicting judgments of co-equal strength, the earlier decision prevails and is binding the subsequent is not binding. The subsequent coordinate Bench cannot take a contrary view, even if it has noticed or commented upon the earlier ruling. In such a situation, the only proper course open to the later Bench is to refer the matter to a larger Bench for authoritative resolution.

Authorities: Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 623 ; Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Shiv Lal v. Ram Babu Dwivedi, 2006 SCC OnLine All 2495.

4. Overruling of Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P., 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529:-

4.1. The judgment in Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P., 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529, stands expressly overruled by the Three-Judge Bench in Bal Thackeray v. Harish Pimpalkhute, (2005) 1 SCC 254.

4.2. Furthermore, the ruling in Pritam Pal was rendered in disregard of binding larger-Bench precedents, thereby rendering it per incuriam. It is also impliedly overruled by the following authoritative judgments of the Supreme Court:

·       Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549 — Three-Judge Bench

·       Dr. L.P. Misra v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 379 — Three-Judge Bench

4.3. These larger-Bench rulings reaffirm that the exercise of contempt jurisdiction must strictly conform to the statutory framework under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and that no Court, not even the Supreme Court, can invoke powers contrary to law or in violation of due process.

4..4. In Suresh Subhashrao Bhoyer v. Manohar, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1545, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court categorically clarified the legal hierarchy between conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court, observing as follows:

“The judgment in Pritam Pal’s case dated 19.02.1992 was rendered by two Honourable Lordships of the Supreme Court, while the judgment in Pallav Sheth was by three Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court. Consequently, no astrologer is required to comment that the later judgment rendered by the Supreme Court by the three Honourable Judges on 10.08.2001 will only hold the field.”

4.5. The Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, in Director, Indira Gandhi Rashtriya Udan Academy v. Sheo Narayan Chaudhary, 2020 (139) ALR 521, has categorically clarified the non-binding nature of Pritam Pal and reaffirmed the supremacy of larger-Bench rulings. The Court observed as under:

“14. So far as the judgment in the case of Pritam Pal (supra), as relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, is concerned, suffice it to state that the said judgment was delivered by two Judges, whereas the judgments in Pallav Seth and Dr. L.P. Misra (supra) were both delivered by three Judges and were also of subsequent dates.”

4.6. In accordance with the doctrine of per incuriam the Constitution Bench judgment in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras, 1952 SCR 425, continues to be a binding precedent. The contrary view expressed in C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, (1971) 1 SCC 626, is per incuriam and not a binding precedent, having been rendered in disregard of the earlier binding Constitution Bench judgment in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras (supra). Further declare that, as per the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy (supra), publication of corrupt practices and misconduct of a Judge, when based on truth is for the larger public good and it does not undermine public confidence in the judiciary. Only false allegations have such an effect.

5. Misuse of Overruled Precedents in Criminal Contempt by “Scandalization”:-

5.1. In most cases concerning alleged criminal contempt by scandalization of the Court, several Benches have conveniently relied upon overruled and non-binding judgments, namely:

·     Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P., 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529;

·     C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, (1971) 1 SCC 626; and

·     Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216, to hold advocates and citizens guilty of contempt merely for attributing motives or criticizing judicial conduct.

5.2. These judgments have, however, been expressly or impliedly overruled by larger and Constitution Bench decisions as well as by subsequent statutory amendments, and therefore no longer constitute binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution.

6. Suppression of Binding Law and Misuse of Contempt Jurisdiction :-

6.1. It is a matter of grave concern that certain Judges and sycophantic members of the Bar, by deliberate suppression of the correct legal position, have been misusing the contempt jurisdiction to protect corrupt or errant judicial officers.
The binding position of law, however, stands unequivocally established that— Whenever there exist credible proofs of corruption, abuse of power, or deliberate misconduct by a Judge, any bona fide pleading or representation based on such facts, seeking criminal or disciplinary prosecution of the concerned Judge, does not constitute contempt of court. Rather, such an act is an exercise of the legal right and constitutional duty under Article 51-A of the Constitution of India, which obliges every citizen to expose corruption and uphold the rule of law.

7. Liability of Those Who Abuse Contempt Process :-

7.1. Judges, Government Law Officers, Advocate Generals, or other persons who initiate or facilitate frivolous or malicious contempt proceedings against advocates or citizens for exposing judicial misconduct are themselves liable to pay compensation to the wrongfully accused, and may also be prosecuted for perjury and abuse of process of law under sec 211, 192, 193, 166, 220, 218, 219, etc of IPC.

7.2. It is now a well-settled constitutional principle that truth cannot be scandalous, and no court can punish for contempt without first establishing that the allegations are false.

7.3. Even the Acting Chief Justice of a Supreme Court, the State, and Bar Associations have been directed in several cases to compensate the advocates and litigants who suffered wrongful prosecution for alleged contempt based on truthful speech.

7.4.        This legal position is consistently affirmed in the following landmark rulings:

(i)   McLeod v. St. Aubyn, (1899) AC 549;

(ii) Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, (1978) 2 WLR 902;

(iii)                 Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association v. R.K. Jain, (2010) 8 SCC 281;

(iv)                  Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie, (2014) 12 SCC 344;

(v)  S.R. Ramraj v. Special Court, Bombay, (2003) 7 SCC 175;

(vi)                 Re: C.S. Karnan, (2017) 7 SCC 1;

(vii)               The Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Madras v. Mr. S. Shankar, 2022 SCC OnLine Mad 4522;

(viii)             Perumal v. Janaki, (2014) SCC (Cri) 591;

(ix)                 Mohd. Nazer M.P. v. State (UT of Lakshadweep), 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 7434;

(x) Hari Dass v. State, AIR 1964 SC 1773;

(xi)                 Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar, (1971) 3 SCC 329;

(xii)               B.S. Sambhu v. T.S. Krishnaswamy, (1983) 1 SCC 11;

(xiii)             State of Maharashtra v. Mangesh, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 672;

(xiv)              Three Cheers Entertainment (P) Ltd. v. CESC Ltd., (2008) 16 SCC 592;

(xv)                Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago, 1936 SCC OnLine PC 15;

(xvi)              Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose, (1914) ILR 41 Cal 173; and

(xvii)            Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v. King-Emperor, [1945] A.C. 264.

(xviii)          Bharat Devdan Salvi v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 42;

(xix)                Walmik Bobde v. State of Maharashtra, 2001 ALL MR (Cri) 1731;

8. Statutory Overruling of C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, (1971) 1 SCC 626 :-

8.1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker, (1988) 3 SCC 167 (para 39), and Biman Basu v. Kallol Guha Thakurta, (2010) 8 SCC 673 (para 23), has categorically ruled that the earlier decision in C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, (1971) 1 SCC 626, stands statutorily overruled by virtue of the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

8.2. The Court further clarified that the judgment in C.K. Daphtary (supra) cannot be treated as a binding precedent, as it was delivered under the repealed law and prior to the codification of contempt jurisprudence through the 1971 Act.

9. Implied Overruling of C.K. Daphtary after the 2006 Amendment and Later Larger bench judgments:-

9.1. The judgment in C.K. Daphtary (supra) also stands impliedly overruled following the 2006 Amendment to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which inserted an explicit statutory defence for the publication of truth in public interest.

9.2. Subsequent decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts have reaffirmed that the publication of truth — even if it results in loss of public confidence in a Judge — does not constitute contempt of court. These rulings collectively affirm that truth is a complete defence, and any contrary reasoning in C.K. Daphtary is rendered obsolete and non est in law.

10. Mandatory Nature of Procedure and Consequences of Deviation :- The Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts have consistently and authoritatively held that all procedural requirements prescribed under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as well as the rules framed thereunder, are mandatory in nature, and that any deviation, omission, or non-compliance renders the entire contempt proceeding — including conviction and sentence — void ab initio.

10.1. This settled position of law has been reaffirmed in the following binding precedents:

(i)   P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258;

(ii) S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1764;

(iii)        Bal Thackeray v. Harish Pimpalkhute, (2005) 1 SCC 254;

(iv)         R.S. Sujatha v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 5 SCC 689;

(v)  Suo Motu v. Nandlal Thakkar, 2012 SCC OnLine Guj 470; and

(vi)         Suo Motu v. Yeshwanth Shenoy, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6231.

10.2. These judgments collectively affirm that non-mentioning of the specific charge in the notice, failure to frame a formal charge, denial of opportunity to file a defence or to cross-examine witnesses, or any non-compliance with Sections 14 and 15 of the Act, constitutes a violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice.

10.3. Consequently, such defective proceedings are vitiated in their entirety, and any resultant conviction or sentence is illegal, unconstitutional, and non-est in law.

11. Sentencing Beyond Statutory Limit — Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh is a non binding Per Incuriam judgment.

11.1. The Two-Judge Bench judgment in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158, wherein a sentence of one year’s imprisonment was imposed for contempt, stands per incuriam, being in direct conflict with the binding Constitution Bench pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in:

·       Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549; and

·       Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409,(5-J).

wherein it was categorically held that no Court, including the Supreme Court, can impose punishment beyond the statutory limit prescribed under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

11.2. The larger Benches have explicitly clarified that the maximum permissible punishment under law is six months’ simple imprisonment or a fine of ₹2,000, or both, and that any enhancement or alteration of this statutory limit would amount to an unconstitutional exercise of power.

11.3.     This restriction is constitutionally reinforced under Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India and Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibit imposition of any punishment exceeding that prescribed by law in force at the time of the alleged offence.

11.4. In Bal Kishan Giri v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 7 SCC 280, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the statutory ceiling under Section 12 and directed refund of any fine imposed in excess of ₹2,000, holding that imposition of punishment beyond the statutory limit is without jurisdiction and void ab initio. This principle has been consistently followed and affirmed in:

·       Gostho Behari Das v. Dipak Kumar Sanyal, (2023) 20 SCC 158; and

·       Khemchand Agrawal v. Commissioner, Irrigation, 2004 SCC OnLine Ori 119,

11.5. In Vijay Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 242, the Hon’ble Supreme Court lucidly explained the scope of this constitutional protection:

“Undoubtedly, in a civilized society governed by rule of law, the punishment not prescribed under the statutory rules cannot be imposed. Principle enshrined in Criminal Jurisprudence to this effect is prescribed in legal maxim nulla poena sine lege which means that a person should not be made to suffer penalty except for a clear breach of existing law.

12. Overruled, Per Incuriam, and Controversial Judgments in Re: Vijay Kurle and Re: Prashant Bhushan :-

12.1. The judgments rendered in Vijay Kurle, In re, (2021) 13 SCC 616, and Prashant Bhushan, In re (Contempt Matter), (2021) 1 SCC 745, are among the most controversial, overruled, and per incuriam decisions in the history of contempt jurisprudence.

12.2.     Both these judgments were founded upon overruled and non-binding precedents, namely:

• Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P., 1993 Supp (1) SCC 529, and
• C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, (1971) 1 SCC 626,

while completely ignoring the binding ratio laid down by the larger and Constitution Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, including:

(i)   Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549 (Three-Judge Bench);

(ii) Dr. L.P. Misra v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 379 (Three-Judge Bench);

(iii)        Bal Thackeray v. Harish Pimpalkhute, (2005) 1 SCC 254 (Three-Judge Bench); and

(iv)        Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie, (2014) 12 SCC 344 (Five-Judge Bench).

12.3. These binding authorities collectively establish that:

(i)   The procedure prescribed under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is mandatory, and its violation vitiates the entire proceeding;

(ii) Truth and good faith are complete defences to a charge of contempt; and

(iii)        Judicial criticism made bona fide in public interest does not amount to contempt.

12.4. The judgments in Re: Vijay Kurle and Re: Prashant Bhushan, having disregarded these settled principles, are therefore per incuriam, contrary to the Constitution Bench law, and non est in law.

13. Correct and Binding Judicial Position Clarified by Larger and recent Benches :-  

13.1. The recent Three-Judge Bench decision in P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258, and the another landmark  ruling in S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1764, represent the correct and binding exposition of the law governing contempt jurisdiction, procedure, and proportionality of punishment.

13.2.     These judgments affirm that:

·       The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is a complete code regulating the initiation, cognizance, trial, and punishment of contempt;

·       Every procedural safeguard under Sections 14 and 15 is mandatory; and

·       The exercise of contempt power is subject to constitutional limitations under Articles 14, 19, 20, and 21.

13.3. These principles are further fortified by the following larger Bench authorities:

·       Khushi Ram v. Sheo Vati, (1953) 1 SCC 726 (Four-Judge Bench);

·       Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court, (1974) 1 SCC 374 (Five-Judge Bench); and

·       Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Ltd. v. SEBI, (2012) 10 SCC 603 (Five-Judge Bench).

13.4. Together, these rulings conclusively establish that the jurisdiction of contempt is not inherent or unlimited, but strictly circumscribed by statute and constitutional safeguards, and any deviation therefrom renders the proceeding void and unconstitutional.

15. Procedural and Constitutional Safeguards Available to the Alleged Contemnor:-

15.1. That there exist several statutory and constitutional safeguards available to an alleged contemnor, who is entitled to all protections and procedural rights guaranteed to an accused in a criminal trial. The law of contempt, being quasi-criminal in nature, mandates strict adherence to the standards of fairness and due process applicable in criminal jurisprudence.

Accordingly, the alleged contemnor is entitled to:

1.    Presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt;

2.    The benefit of doubt in case of any ambiguity or insufficiency of evidence;

3.    Protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right against self-incrimination; and

4.    The right to remain silent during the pendency of proceedings and not to disclose his complete defence until the conclusion of the trial.

15.2. It is further submitted that the alleged contemnor may disprove the prosecution’s case and establish his defence without entering the witness box or filing a detailed written statement. He is also entitled to summon witnesses, produce documents, and cross-examine the prosecution witnesses to expose falsity, inconsistencies, or lack of credibility in the evidence led against him.

15.3. These safeguards flow not only from Articles 14, 20, and 21 of the Constitution of India, but also from the principles of natural justice and criminal due process, and are an inseparable component of the right to a fair trial guaranteed to every person facing contempt proceedings.

15.4. The alleged contemnor cannot be compelled to disclose his complete defence or to incriminate himself. He is entitled to maintain silence till the conclusion of trial and to demolish the prosecution case by way of cross-examination of witnesses.

Reliance is placed upon the following authorities:

·       Clough Engg. Ltd. v. ONGC, 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 372;

·       Bloom v. State of Illinois, 1968 SCC OnLine US SC 93;

·       National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600;

·       Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose, (1914) ILR 41 Cal 173;

·       Comet Products U.K. Ltd. v. Hawkex Plastics Ltd., (1971) 2 QB 67;

·       S.A. Khan v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, (1993) 3 SCC 151; and

·       Achhar Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 543.

16. That the accused – contemnor is entitled to take multiple or even inconsistent defences, and any inconsistency or even falsity in such defences cannot be used to strengthen the prosecution case. The burden of proof lies solely upon the prosecution to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. [National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600].

17. A Three-Judge Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. L.P. Misra v. State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 379, stands as a binding and categorical pronouncement on the scope of Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court emphatically held that even in the gravest instances of alleged contemptuous behaviour — including acts of abuse, threats, or intimidation directed at Judges within the courtroom — the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 14 must be scrupulously followed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that the summary power of conviction cannot be invoked merely on the ground that the contempt occurred in the face of the Court, and that dispensing with procedural safeguards such as framing of charge, issuance of notice, and opportunity of defence would amount to violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It was further held that a conviction or punishment imposed without adherence to the mandatory procedure is unconstitutional, void, and non est in law, as the essence of judicial power lies not in its swiftness of retribution, but in its conformity to due process and fairness.  

18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case of a more aggravated nature than the present one — Mehmood Pracha v. Central Administrative Tribunal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1029 — has authoritatively clarified the true scope and limitations of the summary procedure contemplated under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The ratio implies that the summary power of dispensing with the mandatory procedural safeguards, as recognized in Leila David (6) v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 10 SCC 337, is strictly confined to cases involving violent, contumacious, or physically disruptive conduct within the courtroom — such as acts that endanger order, decorum, or safety, for instance, throwing footwear or committing physical assault. It rules that where the alleged contempt arises   from the use of inappropriate, intemperate, or mistaken language during submissions, or from legal arguments advanced, the person concerned cannot be subjected to summary conviction or instant custody, and the full procedure of notice, hearing, cross examination and defence under Section 14 must be scrupulously followed.  

19. A similar principle was enunciated by a Three-Judge Bench in Vinay Chandra Mishra, In re, (1995) 2 SCC 584,  it is  ruled as under:

‘‘9. …… …. However, the fact that the process is summary does not mean that the procedural requirement, viz., that an opportunity of meeting the charge, is denied to the contemner. 

20. Change of Bench :-  The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Zahir Khan v. Vijai Singh, AIR 1992 SC 642, interpreted Section 14(2) of the Act and held that it is the duty of the Court that the alleged contemnor must be informed of his right to have the charge tried by another Bench.  

See also:-

·       Suo Motu (Court on it own Motion Vs. Satish Mahadeorao Uke 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 5164 ; 

·        Court own its own motion Vs. Nilesh C. Ojha 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 3908,

20.1. In the case of R.V. Lee, (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 394, Field, J., observed;

“There is no warrant for holding that, where the Justice has acted as member by directing a prosecution for an offence under the Act, he is sufficiently disqualified person so as to be sit as Judge at the hearing of the information.”

20.2. Nine Judge Bench  of US Supreme Court in Offutt v. United States,  1954 SCC OnLine US SC 64;   ruled   that a judge must not preside over contempt proceedings where his personal feelings are involved. It was further emphasized that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done — meaning that a judge should recuse himself from hearing any contempt matter where the alleged misconduct is interlinked with his personal grievance or irritation against counsel.  The Court warned that judges, being human, may inadvertently confuse an insult to themselves with an obstruction of justice, and therefore must exercise restraint.

21. Suspension of sentence, right to bail and Appeal  :-

21.1 The proviso to Section 14(4) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 expressly mandates that pending trial of contempt, the person charged shall be released on bail or on executing a bond without surety, conditioned upon his appearance before the Court. The law does not contemplate continued detention once such undertaking is given.

21.2. In Suo Motu v. C.K. Mohanan, 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 21105, the Hon’ble Kerala High Court categorically ruled that advocates should not be committed to custody in contempt proceedings where they have undertaken to appear before the Court. The Court emphasized that, being officers of the Court, lawyers are expected to cooperate with judicial processes, and their professional assurance to remain present is sufficient compliance with the purpose of ensuring attendance.  

21.3. Similarly, in Court on its Own Motion v. K.K. Jha, 2007 SCC OnLine Jhar 177, the Hon’ble Jharkhand High Court directed the advocate to give  an undertaking to appear before the Bench, observing that advocates should not be subjected to custody for submissions made during proceedings.

21.4. That in Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar, (2009) 2 SCC 784, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relying upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Ashis Chakraborty & Ors. v. Hindustan Lever Sramik Karamchari Congress & Ors., [96 CWN 673], categorically held that a person detained under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, pending hearing on the charge of contempt, has an enforceable right to be released on bail. The Court further observed that if such right is curtailed by denial of bail or by the imposition of excessive or onerous bond conditions, the alleged contemnor possesses a statutory right of appeal against such order, since the right to bail cannot be rendered illusory through disproportionate or punitive restrictions.  

21.5. In Housing Development Corporation Vs Sureshchandra Parekh 2019 ALL MR (Cri.) 2429 : 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 138  it is ruled as under;

“(ii)          Since appeal against the order of this court is provided as right under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Court Act,1971, we deem it appropriate to suspend the execution and operation of the substantive sentence for a period of 60 days from the date of this order,

(iii)        The contemnor shall surrender on 2^nd April 2019 before the Register (Judicial) of this Court, in case no appeal is preferred or the sentence is not suspended by the Supreme Court in the meanwhile.

21.6. Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Association of Retired Supreme Court & High Court Judges, (2024) 3 SCC 1, wherein it was ruled that the power under Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, to commit any person to custody during pendency of charge must be exercised only in rare and extraordinary situations involving violence or offensive gross misconduct, such as physical acts like throwing footwear, and not against the person availing legal remedies like filing of recall, review petition or for mere verbal exchanges or submissions advanced during legal argument.

22. Prohibitions and Judicial Restraints on Taking Cognizance of Contempt :-

22.1. It is well-settled that the power to punish for contempt is an exceptional and delicate jurisdiction, to be exercised with great care, caution, and restraint, only in cases where silence would undermine the very administration of justice.

22.2. Six Rules Test — Laid Down by the Full Bench in S. Mulgaokar, In re, (1978) 3 SCC 339 :- In the landmark judgment of S. Mulgaokar, In re, a Full Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, speaking through Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, laid down the celebrated “Six Rules Test” — a self-imposed code of judicial restraint guiding when not to take cognizance of contempt. The Court emphasized that the power of contempt should not be invoked to vindicate personal dignity or judicial ego, but only when necessary to preserve the authority of justice itself. The six guiding principles — now recognized as part of constitutional convention — collectively enjoin “wise economy of use” of contempt powers, ensuring that courts act only when silence is no longer an option. 

23. Judicial Warning Against Indiscriminate Use — T.C. Gupta v. Hari Om Prakash, (2013) 10 SCC 658 :-

23.1. In T.C. Gupta v. Hari Om Prakash, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated these principles and reaffirmed that the contempt jurisdiction must always be exercised cautiously, wisely, and with circumspection. The Court, quoting from the Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, In re, [AIR 1965 SC 745], observed as under:

“Judges must always keep in mind the timeless warning of Lord Atkin in Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago, (1936) 44 LW 15 : AIR 1936 PC 141:

‘Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and even the outspoken comments of ordinary men.’

23.2. The power to punish for contempt, large as it is, must be exercised with caution and restraint. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power, out of irritation or anger, would not sustain the dignity of the court but may in fact diminish it. The best way to uphold the dignity of the judiciary is not by punishment, but by the quality of judgments, fairness, objectivity, and decorum in judicial conduct.”* (AIR p.791, para 142)*

The Bench further observed:

“The power to punish for contempt is a rare species of judicial power, which by its very nature calls for the highest degree of self-restraint. As held in Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 221 : 1971 Cri LJ 268, and reaffirmed in S. Mulgaokar, In re, the first principle of such exercise is the ‘wise economy of use’ of the contempt power by the court.”

23.3. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of contempt is to be invoked only when “silence is no longer an option.”

24. Essence of the Rule: – The cumulative effect of these judgments establishes that before taking cognizance of contempt — particularly for “scandalization” or criticism of the judiciary — the Court must apply a constitutional filter of necessity, proportionality, and restraint. Contempt action is justified only where it becomes indispensable to protect the very foundation of justice, and never to shield individual judges from public scrutiny or fair criticism.

25. Judicial Restraint and Earned Respect — Principles in Rajesh Kumar Singh v. High Court of Judicature of M.P., (2007) 14 SCC 126 :-

25.1. In Rajesh Kumar Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 14 SCC 126, the Hon’ble Supreme Court issued a strong and enduring reminder on the limits of contempt jurisdiction and the imperative of judicial self-restraint. The Court, speaking through a two-Judge Bench, observed as under:

“This Court has repeatedly cautioned that the power to punish for contempt is not intended to be invoked or exercised routinely or mechanically, but only with circumspection and restraint. Courts should not readily infer an intention to scandalize or lower the authority of the Court unless such intention is clearly established. Nor should the power to punish for contempt be exercised where the issue involves a mere question of propriety.”

25.2. The Bench referred with approval to Rizwan-ul-Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1953 Cri LJ 911, reaffirming that:

“The jurisdiction in contempt should not be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice.”

25.3 . The Court then made a profound observation of contemporary relevance:

“A perception is slowly gaining ground among the public that some Judges are becoming over-sensitive and treating even technical violations or unintended acts as contempt. While this may sometimes be done in the name of upholding the majesty of courts, it must be remembered that Judges, like everyone else, must earn respect — they cannot demand it by demonstration of power.”

25.4. Citing Chief Justice John Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Bench reminded that:

“The real power of the judiciary does not lie in imposing sentences or punishing for contempt, but in the trust, confidence, and faith of the common man.”

25.5. The Court emphasized that the true object of the law of contempt is to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice, not to vindicate judicial prestige or personal authority. It cautioned that ostentatious or excessive use of contempt powers has the opposite effect, eroding rather than enhancing respect for the courts.

“Care must therefore be taken to ensure that there is no room for complaints of ostentatious exercise of power.”

25.6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further identified three categories of improper exercise of contempt power, which, rather than commanding respect, may actually undermine judicial credibility:

1.    Punishing persons for unintended acts or technical violations by treating them as contempt of court;

2.    Frequent summoning of Government officers to court merely to sermonize or reprimand them for perceived administrative lapses; and

3.    Making avoidable adverse remarks or observations against persons who are not parties to the proceedings.

25.7. The Bench concluded with a warning that such practices, far from strengthening judicial dignity, erode the faith and confidence of the public in the judiciary — the very foundation upon which the institution stands.

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