Facts may speak, but it is precedent that gives them their legal voice. Evidence does not control law; law controls evidence through binding precedent.
The real courtroom revolution is seeing precedents not as records of cases past, but as living evidence of law itself.
Judicial pronouncements are the true evidence of law. A fact, however compelling on the surface, has no legal force unless it is tested against judicially established standards of admissibility and reliability. It is the precedent that converts facts into evidence, giving them meaning within the constitutional framework of law. Without the interpretative and normative framework laid down by courts of binding authority, facts remain raw, unrefined, and incapable of producing lawful consequences.”
“Binding precedent is the engine that transforms raw facts into lawful judgments. It takes unstructured materials, the testimonies, documents, and circumstances of a case, and processes them through the machinery of established principles. In doing so, it ensures that judicial outcomes are not products of individual preference or subjective discretion, but of a disciplined adherence to law. This transformation safeguards consistency across cases, ensures predictability of outcomes, and affirms the constitutional guarantee of equality before law.”
“Binding precedent is, therefore, the lifeblood of justice. It sustains the entire system by ensuring that law is not blind to fairness, that evidence is not stripped of its meaning, and that procedure is not left to arbitrary will. Where precedent is ignored, evidence loses its legal value, procedure collapses into uncertainty, and law itself stands weakened. By preserving the uniformity, legality, and integrity of adjudication, binding judicial pronouncements function as constitutional instruments of justice, breathing life into the rule of law itself.”
Binding judicial pronouncements constitute the supreme and controlling standard of ‘evidence of law’. They represent the ultimate and conclusive form of such evidence, standing at the highest pedestal in the hierarchy of legal sources. Their authority extends beyond mere interpretation of statutes or constitutional provisions; they govern the admissibility, probative value, and applicability of all other forms of evidence. In addition, binding precedents prescribe and regulate the procedural framework to be followed by courts, lay down the technical requirements essential for adjudication, and delimit the scope and exercise of judicial discretion itself. In effect, they form the compass by which every fact in issue must be tested, every piece of evidence weighed, and every judicial determination made. Any adjudication rendered in disregard of such precedent is constitutionally infirm, jurisdictionally void, and contrary to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that any judicial order passed in ignorance or disregard of binding precedent is jurisdictionally void, vitiated, and wholly without legal sanctity. All courts and authorities are constitutionally bound to comply with binding precedent, failing which their orders are rendered null and void.
Harish Arora v. The Dy. Registrar, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2853; State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85; Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1;Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija v. The Collector, Thane, AIR 1990 SC 261.
1. Precedents as Additional Legal Evidence Consequently, all judicial pronouncements relied upon and cited by a litigant are to be treated as additional legal evidence of law, forming an integral part of and in support of that party’s defence. These pronouncements are not persuasive references but binding declarations of law, carrying the highest probative value.
2. Doctrine of Malice in Law. It is further settled that any order contrary to binding precedent is not only void but constitutes malice in law. The very act of ignoring or disregarding established precedent, whether through ignorance or willful omission, amounts to legal malice, as it strikes at the rule of law and undermines constitutional governance. Harish Arora (supra); Dayanand (supra).
3. Constitutional and Jurisprudential Foundation: Article 141: – Binding Effect of Supreme Court Law Judicial pronouncements, being authoritative declarations of law by competent courts, are the highest form of “evidence of law” within the constitutional framework. Article 141 of the Constitution of India expressly mandates:
“The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.”
Thus, precedents of the Supreme Court are binding across the nation, while decisions of High Courts are binding on subordinate courts and co-ordinate benches within their jurisdiction.
4. Uniformity, Predictability, and Stability: The principle of binding precedent ensures uniformity, predictability, and stability in the administration of justice. Judicial discipline requires that every Bench of equal strength follows co-ordinate Bench decisions unless referred to a larger Bench, thereby preventing judicial chaos and forum shopping.
5. Precedents as the Highest Standard of Legal Evidence Binding precedents are not subordinate to other forms of evidence. They operate as the yardstick by which all other evidence, oral, documentary, or expert, is tested and evaluated. They stand at a higher pedestal because they embody the crystallized law under which facts must be adjudged.
6. Constitutional Obligation and Consequence of Disregard: The Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled that disregard of binding precedent is not a mere lapse of judicial discipline but a constitutional violation. Where the disregard is willful, it amounts to “malice in law,” which vitiates the order ab initio. Thus, adherence to precedent is not discretionary but mandatory for all judicial and quasi-judicial authorities.
In the recent case of In Re: N. Peddi Raju, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1694, a three judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while quoting earlier rulings and drawing strength from the celebrated judgment of Lord Denning of the Queen’s Bench, laid down the law regarding the solemn duty of senior advocates. It was categorically ruled that withholding relevant documents or binding precedents is an unethical practice.
This categorically indicates that the binding precedents are not inferior to documentary evidence. And its suppression is equal to the suppression of any other evidence. On the contrary, the binding precedents represent the authoritative declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution. To conceal or withhold such binding pronouncements is to commit a fraud upon the Court, striking at the very root of justice.
This pronouncement reinforces the principle that all binding precedents must be disclosed with utmost candour. Suppression in this regard is not a matter of inadvertence or negligence—it constitutes deliberate misconduct.
Duty of Advocates Towards the Court
The duty of an advocate transcends the mere representation of a client. It embodies a solemn responsibility to assist the Court fairly and truthfully. When an advocate suppresses binding law or deliberately misleads the Court by making submissions contrary to authoritative precedents, such conduct:
· amounts to gross professional misconduct,
· reflects a serious fall in ethical standards, and
· endangers the sanctity and integrity of judicial proceedings.
The law recognises that any advocate who knowingly argues against binding precedents breaches professional duty and undermines the foundation of justice itself.
Judicial Recognition in a Catena of Decisions
This principle has been consistently reaffirmed in numerous judgments, including but not limited to:
New Delhi Municipal Council v. Prominent Hotels Limited, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 11910
Lal Bahadur Gautam v. State of U.P., (2019) 6 SCC 441
State of Orissa v. Nalinikanta Muduli, (2004) 7 SCC 19
Heena Nikhil Dharia v. Kokilaben Kirtikumar Nayak, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9859
Sunita Pandey v. State of Uttarakhand, 2018 SCC OnLine Utt 933
Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. v. ICI India Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 74
Culminating Principle
From the above authorities, the principle emerges with unmistakable clarity:
1. Binding precedents are the highest form of legal evidence.
2. Suppression of binding judgments amounts to fraud upon the Court.
3. Making submissions against binding law constitutes abuse of process and contempt of Court.
4. Failure to disclose or reliance on overruled propositions is professional misconduct.
Final Legal Position
Thus, any attempt to mislead the Court by withholding or disregarding binding precedents constitutes:
· a fraud on justice,
· a breach of professional ethics, and
· an act punishable as contempt of court, in addition to attracting disciplinary action against the erring advocate.
The jurisprudence leaves no doubt that the candour and integrity of the Bar in disclosing binding law is essential to preserve the majesty of justice and the confidence of the public in the judicial process.
7. Judicial Pronouncements as the Highest Standard of “Evidence of Law”
7.1. The Constitutional Command – Article 141: It is respectfully submitted that judicial pronouncements constitute the most authoritative and controlling standard of “evidence of law.” Article 141 of the Constitution leaves no ambiguity:
“The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.”
7.2. This mandate elevates judicial pronouncements beyond mere guidance; they are binding legal standards which every adjudicating authority is constitutionally obliged to apply.
8. Case Law Establishing Precedents as Controlling Evidence of Law
(a) Harish Arora v. The Dy. Registrar, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2853, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court ruled:
“Ignoring Binding Precedent – Omission of Duty and Legal Mala Fides: Respondent No.1’s order is also vitiated by his failure to follow binding legal precedent. […] If the omission was willful, it is even more egregious, suggesting a ‘conscious violation of law to the prejudice of another’, which the Supreme Court has identified as a hallmark of malice in law.”
This judgment is categorical that failure to follow binding precedent is not a mere irregularity but constitutes legal mala fides—thereby vitiating the order itself.
(b) State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“The impugned orders are therefore contrary to the law laid down by this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution and unsustainable. They are therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed.”
Thus, any order contrary to precedent is ipso facto unsustainable and void.
(c) Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that failure to follow precedent not only amounts to an error of law but also undermines the constitutional scheme itself.
(d) Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija v. The Collector, Thane, AIR 1990 SC 261, the Hon’ble Court held:
“Judges are bound by precedents and procedure – They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority.”
This decision affirms that discretion operates only in the absence of precedent; where precedent exists, the judicial duty is to apply it.
9. Why Judicial Pronouncements Qualify as “Evidence of Law” of the Highest Standard.
10. The term “evidence of law” signifies authoritative material establishing the legal framework that governs adjudication. Judicial pronouncements qualify as the highest standard of such evidence because they:
(i) Interpret and define statutory provisions and constitutional guarantees, thereby laying down the exact legal matrix within which facts must be examined.
(ii) Provide controlling legal standards for assessing the truth or falsity of disputed facts.
(iii) Regulate admissibility of evidence, excluding unlawful, irrelevant, or procedurally tainted material.
(iv) Resolve substantive and procedural questions that directly determine the fate of the case.
(v) Protect the innocent and ensure just outcomes, by mandating adjudication according to principle and precedent rather than prejudice or conjecture.
11. Illustrative Example of Superior Evidentiary Value of Law:
11.1. Consider a criminal trial resting substantially on digital evidence—a video recording allegedly depicting the offence. Suppose the trial court, without reference to precedent, accepts the video as sufficient for conviction, even though the accused was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the person who produced it.
11.2. Contrast this with a binding precedent that declares: such electronic evidence, when not tested through cross-examination of its source, is inherently unreliable and inadmissible, and cannot form the sole basis of conviction.
(i) The existence of the video is a matter of fact.
(ii) The legal admissibility of the video is determined by precedent, i.e., “evidence of law.”
(iii) Once precedent is applied, the video becomes legally irrelevant, regardless of its apparent persuasiveness.
This example demonstrates that law governs the value of evidence, not the other way around. A factual item, however compelling in appearance, has no force unless the binding law authorises its admissibility and probative worth.
12. Doctrinal Consequence of Disregarding Precedent: From the above authorities, it emerges that:
(a) Judicial pronouncements are compulsory standards of justice—the highest grade of legal evidence.
(b) They control not just factual evaluation but the very validity of judicial procedure.
(c) Any trial or order in derogation of precedent is jurisdictionally void and has no legal sanctity.
(d) Wilful deviation is treated as malice in law, rendering the proceeding incurably vitiated.
13. Conclusion:
Accordingly, it is humbly submitted that the various binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts, being authoritative declarations of law, constitute “evidence of law” within the meaning recognised by jurisprudence. These judicial pronouncements are integral to the Party’s defence as they prescribe the controlling standards governing admissibility, relevance, and weight of evidence, as well as the procedural and substantive requirements indispensable for a fair trial.
Therefore, all such judicial pronouncements relied upon and cited by the Respondent must be treated as additional legal evidence of law forming an essential and inseparable part of the Respondent’s positive assertion, defence, and submissions. Any adjudication ignoring such precedent would be without jurisdiction, void ab initio, and a grave infraction of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
14. Judicial Precedents as Supreme “Evidence of Law” – The Anokhilal Doctrine: Principle Declared in Anokhilal v. State of M.P., AIR 2020 SC 232: The Hon’ble Supreme Court, speaking through a Three-Judge Bench, declared in categorical terms that violation of established judicial rules of fair trial, especially the right to effective legal representation renders the entire trial void and unconstitutional.
The Court held as under:
“In the present case, when the counsel was appointed just before the trial started, it is clear that there was a failure to comply with the requirements of the rule of procedure in this behalf. (Emphasis supplied) It was also stated that the violation of the mandate of the concerned Rule would amount to breach of rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution.”
The Bench further ruled:
“Conviction of the appellant in a trial held in violation of that Rule and the award of sentence of death will result in the deprivation of his life in breach of the procedure established by law… we set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant. Since we are holding that the conviction is void because of an error in the procedure adopted at the trial, we direct that the appellant shall be tried afresh for this charge after complying with the requirements of law.”
14. This pronouncement reinforces that a binding precedent declaring procedural safeguards under Article 21 is not advisory but compulsory “evidence of law”. It governs the validity of every subsequent proceeding, and any deviation therefrom vitiates the conviction itself.
15. Rule of Fair Trial as Settled Law under Article 21: The Court reiterated that an accused need not even demand legal assistance; the duty lies squarely on the Court to ensure it:
“…it is now settled law that free legal assistance at State cost is a fundamental right of a person accused of an offence which may involve jeopardy to his life or personal liberty and this fundamental right is implicit in the requirement of reasonable, fair and just procedure prescribed by Article 21.”
Thus, Article 21 procedural fairness is crystallized into binding precedent, and by virtue of Article 141, this declaration is “evidence of law” of the highest order.
16. Best Bakery Principles – Fair Hearing as Core of Due Process: The Bench drew strength from the celebrated Best Bakery case, where it was observed:
(a) “Failure to accord fair hearing either to the accused or the prosecution violates even minimum standards of due process of law.”
(b) “Condemnation should be rendered only after a trial in which the hearing is a real one, not sham or a mere farce.”
(c) “Fair trial… consists not only in technical observance of law but also in recognition and just application of its principles in substance, to find out the truth and prevent miscarriage of justice.”
These dicta confirm that binding precedents enshrine substantive principles of justice, which every trial court must treat as compulsory standards, not optional guidance.
17. Ankush Maruti Shinde – Opportunity of Hearing as Non-Negotiable: In Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 667, this Court set aside death sentences imposed without affording the accused proper opportunity to be heard in enhancement appeals.
It held that deprivation of hearing amounts to denial of justice and vitiates the conviction. The judgment was recalled and, on rehearing, the accused were acquitted.
This affirms that orders passed in breach of precedent-mandated procedural safeguards are jurisdictionally void.
18. V.K. Sasikala – Speed Cannot Override Precedent: In V.K. Sasikala v. State (2012) 9 SCC 771, the Court cautioned:
“While the anxiety to bring the trial to its earliest conclusion has to be shared, it is fundamental that in the process none of the well-entrenched principles of law that have been laboriously built by illuminating judicial precedents are sacrificed or compromised.”
This further underscores that binding precedents are the supreme measure of validity. Expediency or procedural shortcuts cannot override them.
19. Constitutional Integration: The cumulative essence of these decisions — Anokhilal, Best Bakery, Ankush Shinde, V.K. Sasikala — is that:
(a) Judicial precedents lay down binding standards of fair trial.
(b) These standards form the controlling evidence of law, superseding all other evidentiary materials.
(c) Any proceeding in derogation thereof is unconstitutional under Article 21, and void ab initio.
(d) Disregard of precedent amounts to malice in law, a recognised ground for nullification.
Therefore, it stands concluded that binding precedents are not merely persuasive observations, but operate as the most authoritative “evidence of law,” controlling the validity of every judicial proceeding. All courts are constitutionally bound to apply them, and orders contrary thereto are nullities in the eyes of law.
20. The Three Judge bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Anokhilal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2020 SC 232, ruled as under;
“The learned Amicus Curiae came to be appointed the same day when the charges were framed, which effectively means that the learned Amicus Curiae did not have sufficient opportunity to study the matter nor did he have any opportunity to have any interaction with the accused to seek appropriate instructions;
Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State, however, submitted that the evidence on record, without any doubt, pointed towards the guilt of the accused and as such the order of conviction recorded by the Courts below was correct and did not call for any interference.
The Supreme Court set aside the conviction by observing that;
“In the present case, when the counsel was appointed just before the trial started, it is clear that there was failure to comply with the requirements of the rule of procedure in this behalf.
(Emphasis by us) It was also stated that the violation of the mandate of the concerned Rule would amount to breach of rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution as under:
“In these circumstances, conviction of the appellant in a trial held in violation of that Rule and the award of sentence of death will result in the deprivation of his life in breach of the procedure established by law.” The operative part of the decision was :-
“As a consequence, we set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant. Since we are holding that the conviction is void because of an error in the procedure adopted at the trial, we direct that the appellant shall be tried afresh for this charge after complying with the requirements of law, so that the case is remanded to the Court of Session for this purpose.”
…an accused need not ask for legal assistance—the Court dealing with the case is obliged to inform him or her of the entitlement to free legal aid. This Court observed that (SCC p. 407, para 5) it was now “settled law that free legal assistance at State cost is a fundamental right of a person accused of an offence which may involve jeopardy to his life or personal liberty and this fundamental right is implicit in the requirement of reasonable, fair and just procedure prescribed by Article 21 [of the Constitution]”
21. In Best Bakery case19, the Court also made the following observations: (SCC p. 187, paras 38-40);
“38. A criminal trial is a judicial examination of the issues in the case and its purpose is to arrive at a judgment on an issue as to a fact or relevant facts which may lead to the discovery of the fact issue and obtain proof of such facts at which the prosecution and the accused have arrived by their pleadings; the controlling question being the guilt or innocence of the accused. Since the object is to mete out justice and to convict the guilty and protect the innocent, the trial should be a search for the truth and not a bout over technicalities, and must be conducted under such rules as will protect the innocent, and punish the guilty. The proof of charge which has to be beyond reasonable doubt must depend upon judicial evaluation of the totality of the evidence, oral and circumstantial, and not by an isolated scrutiny.
39. Failure to accord fair hearing either to the accused or the prosecution violates even minimum standards of due process of law. It is inherent in the concept of due process of law, that condemnation should be rendered only after the trial in which the hearing is a real one, not sham or a mere farce and pretence. Since the fair hearing requires an opportunity to preserve the process, it may be vitiated and violated by an overhasty, stage-managed, tailored and partisan trial.
40. The fair trial for a criminal offence consists not only in technical observance of the frame and forms of law, but also in recognition and just application of its principles in substance, to find out the truth and prevent miscarriage of justice.”
The Bench emphasised that: (Best Bakery case19, SCC p. 192, para 52
“52. Whether a retrial under Section 386 of the Code or taking up of additional evidence under Section 391 of the Code [in a given case] is the proper procedure will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case for which no straitjacket formula of universal and invariable application can be formulated.”
40. “Speedy trial” and “fair trial” to a person accused of a crime are integral part of Article 21. There is, however, qualitative difference between the right to speedy trial and the accused’s right of fair trial. Unlike the accused’s right of fair trial, deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused in defending himself. The right to speedy trial is in its very nature relative. It depends upon diverse circumstances. Each case of delay in conclusion of a criminal trial has to be seen in the facts and circumstances of such case. Mere lapse of several years since the commencement of prosecution by itself may not justify the discontinuance of prosecution or dismissal of indictment. The factors concerning the accused’s right to speedy trial have to be weighed vis-à-vis the impact of the crime on society and the confidence of the people in judicial system. Speedy trial secures rights to an accused but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. The nature and gravity of crime, persons involved, social impact and societal needs must be weighed along with the right of the accused to speedy trial and if the balance tilts in favour of the former the long delay in conclusion of criminal trial should not operate against the continuation of prosecution and if the right of the accused in the facts and circumstances of the case and exigencies of situation tilts the balance in his favour, the prosecution may be brought to an end. These principles must apply as well when the appeal court is confronted with the question whether or not retrial of an accused should be ordered.”
22. In Ankush Maruti Shinde and others vs. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 667, the High Court had upheld the conviction and death sentence imposed upon accused nos. 1, 2 and 4, while accused nos. 3, 5 and 6 were sentenced to imprisonment for life. The appeals were preferred by accused nos. 1, 2 and 4 against their conviction and sentence, while Criminal Appeal Nos. 881-882 of 2009 were preferred by the State seeking enhancement of the sentence of life imprisonment to death sentence in respect of accused nos. 3, 5 and 6. In the Appeals preferred by the State, notice was served upon accused nos. 3, 5 and 6 only on 6.12.2008. However, even before service of such notice, the hearing in respect of all the appeals had begun on 04.12.2008. On 10.12.2008 the learned counsel who was appearing for the accused nos. 1, 2 and 4 was appointed as Amicus Curiae to represent accused nos. 3, 5 and 6. The hearing was concluded the same day and the judgment was reserved. By its decision dated 30.04.2009 this Court allowed the Appeals preferred by the State and imposed death sentence upon accused nos. 3, 5 and 6 while confirming the death sentence in respect of accused nos. 1, 2 and 4. All six accused were thus sentenced to death.
23. Thereafter, Review Petition (Crl.)Nos.34-35 of 2010 were preferred by accused nos. 1, 2 and 4 while Review Petition (Crl.)Nos.18- 19 of 2011 were preferred by accused nos. 3, 5 and 6. While allowing Review Petitions by its Order dated 31.10.201821, this Court observed: –
“From the above narration of facts, it is evident that Accused Nos.3, 5 and 6 had no opportunity to be heard by the Bench, before the appeals filed by the State of Maharashtra for enhancement of sentence were decided. They have been deprived of an opportunity of engaging counsel and of urging such submissions as they may have been advised to urge in defence to the appeals filed by the State for enhancement.”
24. This Court, therefore, recalled the Judgment and order dated 30.04.2009 and the Criminal Appeals were restored to the file of this Court to be considered on merits.
25. Subsequently, a Bench of three Judges by its decision dated 05.03.201922 acquitted the concerned accused of the charges levelled against them. This Court also dismissed the appeals preferred by the State for enhancement of sentence qua accused Nos.3, 5 and 6.
26. In V.K. Sasikala vs. State Represented by Superintendent of Police (2012) 9 SCC 771, a caution was expressed by this Court as under: –
“23.4 While the anxiety to bring the trial to its earliest conclusion has to be shared it is fundamental that in the process none of the well- entrenched principles of law that have been laboriously built by illuminating judicial precedents are sacrificed or compromised. In no circumstance, can the cause of justice be made to suffer, though, undoubtedly, it is highly desirable that the finality of any trial is achieved in the quickest possible time.”
27. We, therefore, have no hesitation in setting aside the judgments of conviction and orders of sentence passed by the Trial Court and the High Court against the appellant and directing de novo consideration. It shall be open to the learned counsel representing the appellant in the Trial Court to make any submissions touching upon the issues (i) whether the charges framed by the Trial Court are required to be amended or not; (ii) whether any of the prosecution witnesses need to be recalled for further cross-examination; and (iii) whether any expert evidence is required to be led in response to the FSL report and DNA report. The matter shall, thereafter, be considered on the basis of available material on record in accordance with law.
____________________________________________________________________________ About the Authors: –
For many years, the Author, Adv. Nilesh Ojha, has earned the highest recognition not for presenting new theories, but for teaching generations of lawyers and litigants how to use the existing law as a sure and effective instrument of justice.
Their true contribution lies in showing that the strength of law is not in inventing new doctrines, but in intelligently applying the settled principles and binding precedents of the Hon’ble Courts in a manner that guarantees fairness, consistency, and certainty of outcome. By demonstrating how binding judicial pronouncements operate as the supreme standard of ‘evidence of law’, they have provided the legal community with a transformative lens for practice, turning abstract jurisprudence into a living tool for justice delivery.
This practical jurisprudence has reshaped the way many approach the justice system: no longer as a maze of technicalities, but as a disciplined path where precedents guide outcomes and ensure protection of rights. Adv. Nilesh Ojha’s guidance has enabled numerous litigants and advocates, including those outside the so-called circle of elite or senior lawyers, to secure justice with confidence on the basis of binding precedents. In this way, he has strengthened the role of the common man and empowered non-senior advocates to stand on equal footing in the courts of law.
Their work is always guided by practical ground realities and the constant search for effective solutions. He has remained deeply conscious of the risks of discrimination or injustice that may arise when some judges, whether due to lack of knowledge, personal prejudices, undue favor or ill-will towards certain parties or advocates, or even corruption, pass whimsical and unlawful orders without fear of consequence. By consistently emphasizing the binding force of judicial precedents, he has sought to minimize the scope for such misuse of power and discretion, ensuring that justice is delivered in accordance with settled principles rather than arbitrary will.
His contribution, therefore, is revolutionary not because it invents new doctrines, but because it unlocks the true potential of the law already in force. It is a reminder that justice is most secure when the law is applied with courage, precision, and integrity.
____________________________________________________________________________
Research Contributors:
This research has been conducted by a team of advocates and law researchers, namely:
Adv. Ishwar Lal Agarwal
Adv Vivek Ramteke
Adv. Dipali N Ojha
Adv. Vijay Kurle
Adv. Partho Sarkar
Adv. Abhishek Mishra
Adv. Pratik Jain (Saklecha)
Adv. Nicky Pokar
Adv. Pratik Sarkar
Adv. Meena Thakur
Adv. Devkrishna Bhambri
Adv. Anushka Sonawane
Adv. Shivam Gupta
Mr. Ayush Tiwari
Ms. Payal Padwale
Mr Prabhmeet Singh Chabra
Adv. Vikas Pawar
