A Seven-Judge Constitution Bench decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602, set aside an earlier order passed by a Five-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. Significantly, the impugned order dated 16.02.1984 had been made in proceedings under Article 136, and was subsequently annulled by a larger Bench exercising jurisdiction under the same constitutional provision, thereby demonstrating the Court’s plenary corrective power.
Article 136 confers an extraordinary and discretionary appellate jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court in the widest possible terms:
“Article 136(1): Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.”
A plain and literal reading leaves no ambiguity. The provision authorises appeals from “any judgment or order” of “any court or tribunal” in India. The phrase “any court” is comprehensive and inclusive, and the constitutional text does not expressly exclude the Supreme Court itself from its sweep.
In Antulay, the Seven-Judge Bench emphatically rejected the contention that the Court lacked power to correct its own earlier order in the same proceedings. The Court observed (para 48):
“This Court is not powerless to correct its error which has the effect of depriving a citizen of his fundamental rights and more so, the right to life and liberty. It can do so in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in any proceeding pending before it without insisting on the formalities of a review application. Powers of review can be exercised in a petition filed under Article 136 or Article 32 or under any other provision of the Constitution if the Court is satisfied that its directions have resulted in the deprivation of the fundamental rights of a citizen or any legal right of the petitioner.”
The Bench further reaffirmed the foundational principle that a superior court has an inherent duty to rectify manifest illegality:
“The superior court can always correct its own error brought to its notice either by way of petition or ex debito justitiae.”
The Court also emphasised that procedural rules exist to advance justice, not to defeat it. Where an order is patently contrary to law or results in violation of fundamental rights, courts are duty-bound to correct such errors rather than allow technicalities to perpetuate injustice.
Principle of ex debito justitiae—a duty owed by the court to do justice. It observed that a superior court must correct its own errors once brought to its notice, especially when those errors result in illegality or denial of rights. This principle has deep roots in common law jurisprudence and reflects the idea that justice cannot be sacrificed to procedural rigidity.
Thus, Antulay stands as a clear constitutional authority that the Supreme Court possesses inherent and plenary power to revisit and correct its own orders—even those passed under Article 136—when necessary to prevent deprivation of fundamental rights or miscarriage of justice.
The Bench held that if an order suffers from jurisdictional error, violation of fundamental rights, or manifest illegality, the Court is not bound to perpetuate it merely because it was previously rendered by a Bench of equal strength.
The judgment further emphasised that procedural rules are instruments for advancing justice, not barriers to it. Where strict adherence to procedural formalities would result in injustice, courts must prioritise substantive fairness. The Court made it clear that technical objections cannot stand in the way of correcting an order that is patently contrary to law.
The Court held that it is not powerless to rectify its own errors when they result in deprivation of life, liberty, or other legal rights, even if such correction requires departing from procedural constraints. It underscored that procedural prescriptions exist to facilitate justice, not to obstruct it, and that courts must act ex debito justitiae—as a matter of duty to do justice.
Consistent with this principle, Indian jurisprudence has long adopted the maxim that rules of procedure are the “handmaid of justice,” not its mistress. Courts have reiterated that procedural law should serve as an instrument for advancing justice and must not be applied in a rigid or mechanical manner so as to produce unjust results. Indeed, judicial decisions applying Antulay have expressly noted that procedure cannot be allowed to overshadow substantive justice.
This approach reflects a broader constitutional philosophy. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that when strict adherence to procedural rules would perpetuate illegality or injustice, courts are duty-bound to adopt a pragmatic interpretation that preserves fairness and protects rights. In such situations, justice takes precedence over technical formality.
Accordingly, the jurisprudence flowing from A.R. Antulay and allied cases establishes a clear doctrine:
Procedural rules are tools to advance justice.
They cannot be interpreted to defeat fundamental rights.
Courts possess inherent power to correct injustice.
Substantive fairness prevails over technical rigidity.
In essence, Indian constitutional law firmly rejects the notion that justice must yield to procedural formalism. Rather, it recognises that law exists for justice, and not justice for law.
Recently, a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Vishnu Vardhan v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1501, authoritatively reaffirmed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to reconsider and revisit its own earlier orders. The Court held that under Order LV, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, the Supreme Court possesses inherent powers to secure complete justice. It was emphasized that procedural laws cannot be permitted to tie the hands of the Court in a manner that defeats the rights and interests of affected parties. The Bench categorically observed that the ends of justice demand that grossly unlawful or fraudulent orders must not be allowed to remain on the record of a Court of Record.
A similar principle is laid down by the three Judge bench in Vijay Shekhar v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 666, where the Supreme Court held that no judicial order obtained by fraud can be allowed to stand, as fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings.
Order LV, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, expressly provides:
“Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.”
The inherent powers and constitutional responsibility of a Court of Record were further explained in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Pratibha Industries Ltd., (2019) 3 SCC 203, where the Supreme Court held that a Court of Record not only has the authority but also the affirmative duty to correct patent errors in its own orders. This judgment underscores that the Supreme Court, as the highest constitutional court, is duty-bound to ensure that its orders conform to law, fairness, and justice, and to set aside any order that is demonstrably illegal or unjust.
The Supreme Court in National Fertilizers Limited v. Tuncay Alankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600, recalled its own order of conviction for contempt upon finding that the conviction had been passed on an erroneous premise and court failed to take correct facts in to account. It is well settled that when an order of the Supreme Court is found to be based on incorrect assumptions or mistaken facts, the Court possesses both the jurisdiction and the duty to recall and rectify such an order in the interest of justice.
In State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639(3-J), it is ruled that;
“69. The courts are not to perpetuate an illegality, rather it is the duty of the courts to rectify mistakes. …. … To perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is the compulsion of judicial conscience. In this we derive comfort and strength from the wise and inspiring words of Justice Bronson in Pierce v. Delameter [1 NY 3 (1847)] , AMY at p. 18: “a Judge ought to be wise enough to know that he is fallible and therefore ever ready to learn : great and honest enough to discard all mere pride of opinion and follow truth wherever it may lead : and courageous enough to acknowledge his errors.”’ [Ed. : As observed in Distributors (Baroda) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 43, p. 46, para 2.] ””
A three judges bench in the case of New India Assurance Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kumar Pandey 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1786, has ruled that the category of cases when order can be recalled by the same bench.
It is ruled as under;
“11.[…….] In paragraph 46 in particular, this Court held in Davinder Pal Singh as follows:
“46. If a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice or where the order has been pronounced without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected by it or where an order was obtained by abuse of the process of court which would really amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent powers can be exercised to recall such order for the reason that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity and the provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C. would not operate.
In such an eventuality, the judgment is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule of natural justice. The power of recall is different from the power of altering/reviewing the judgment.”
Indian law clearly recognizes recall of an order as a distinct and powerful remedy, separate from review. In Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb, (1999) 4 SCC 396, the Supreme Court held that a court has inherent power to recall its order when:
it is obtained by fraud or misrepresentation,
the court is misled by a party,
the court itself commits a mistake prejudicing a party,
the order is passed without notice to a necessary party, or
the proceedings suffer from patent lack of jurisdiction.
Similarly, in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550, the Court affirmed that when a party is prejudiced due to the court’s own mistake or misrepresentation by the opposite side, the order must be recalled in the interest of justice.
The distinction between recall and review was reiterated in Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P., (2011) 14 SCC 813, where it was held that recall is appropriate when an order is passed without granting a fair opportunity of hearing, whereas review concerns correction of errors on merits.
In Ravindra Narayan Joglekar vs. Encon Exports Pvt. Ltd. (2008 ALL MR (Cri.) 2032), it is ruled that any order patently contrary to legal provisions must not be allowed to remain in force. The orders causing irreparable harm or undue prejudice must be recalled to uphold the principles of justice.
Recently, in Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India v. Vanashakti, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2474, a wrongful and per incuriam order passed by a Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was set aside by a Three-Judge Bench. This decision once again reaffirms the settled legal position that orders of smaller Benches, if found to be contrary to binding precedents or passed in disregard of established law, are liable to be corrected by larger Benches in the interest of justice.
The principle that courts must always correct their own errors and steer the law back onto the correct path has been emphatically recognized by the Supreme Court of India in several authoritative pronouncements. A Seven-Judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1990) 1 SCC 109, while dealing with the necessity of rectifying judicial mistakes, approvingly relied upon the celebrated observations of Lord Denning in Ostime v. Australian Mutual Provident Society, (1959) 3 All ER 245 : 1960 AC 459, as well as the dissenting note of Justice Jackson in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States, 92 L Ed 968. In those decisions, it was observed in substance that when a court realizes that it has embarked upon a wrong course, it must make every effort to return to the correct direction, for courts of law are duty-bound to proceed on the right path rather than perpetuate an error merely in the name of finality.
In M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana, (2000) 1 SCC 278, a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court entertained a writ petition and set aside a conviction for contempt that had earlier been imposed by a Two-Judge Bench, holding that the earlier order was passed without jurisdiction and contrary to statutory provisions. This judgment authoritatively established that even orders of the Supreme Court can be corrected when they suffer from jurisdictional or procedural illegality.
Similarly, in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, a Five-Judge Constitution Bench set aside an order passed by a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, after finding that the earlier Bench had acted beyond its jurisdiction and in violation of statutory limitations governing contempt jurisdiction.
These observations make it abundantly clear that the doctrine of finality cannot override the paramount consideration of justice. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that where a judicial order results in manifest injustice, or where its continuance would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court, inherent powers must be exercised to recall, review, or rectify such orders. The jurisprudential foundation of this power lies in the universal acknowledgment of human fallibility and the corresponding duty of constitutional courts to ensure that the law ultimately operates in the service of justice.
