The judgment of the Kerala High Court in Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Union of India, Citation: 2025:KER:97826 dated 18.12.2025, is per incuriam and no longer constitutes good law, as the High Court has returned findings in direct conflict with binding Constitution Bench and larger Bench decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while simultaneously placing reliance on overruled, eclipsed, and obsolete precedents, in clear violation of Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
Point No. 1:- Erroneous Grant of Immunity to Judges of Constitutional Courts from Contempt Proceedings – Finding Per Incuriam.
Another grave and independent per incuriam infirmity in the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Union of India, 2025:KER:97826 dated 18.12.2025, arises from its observations suggesting immunity to Judges of Constitutional Courts from contempt proceedings. These observations are founded upon reliance on judgments which stand expressly overruled by a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
The Kerala High Court relied upon a judgment of the Patna High Court and a three-Judge Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to hold or imply that Judges of Constitutional Courts enjoy immunity from contempt proceedings. Such reliance is legally unsustainable, as both the aforesaid judgments stand overruled, eclipsed and rendered non est in law after the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in In Re: C.S. Karnan, (2017) 7 SCC 1.
In In Re: C.S. Karnan, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, speaking through a Seven-Judge Bench, conclusively settled the law on this issue. In paragraph 1 as well as paragraph 60 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically ruled that the identity or constitutional position of the contemnor is wholly inconsequential. What is determinative is the act of contempt and its impact on the administration of justice.
The Seven-Judge Bench unequivocally held that the Supreme Court is vested with jurisdiction to take cognizance of contempt and initiate proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, even against a sitting Judge of a High Court. In that very case, a sitting High Court Judge was found guilty of criminal contempt, convicted, and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of seven months.
The judgment in In Re: C.S. Karnan thus authoritatively declares that:
- No Judge, including a Judge of a Constitutional Court, enjoys immunity from contempt jurisdiction;
- Equality before law under Article 14 applies equally to Judges and non-Judges; and
- Judicial office cannot be used as a shield to commit acts that scandalise the court or obstruct the administration of justice.
In the face of this binding Seven-Judge Bench decision, any reliance on pre-existing or contrary High Court judgments or smaller Bench decisions of the Supreme Court is impermissible. Such reliance is directly hit by Article 141 of the Constitution and the doctrine of precedent.
Accordingly, the observations of the Kerala High Court granting or implying immunity to Judges of Constitutional Courts from contempt proceedings are rendered per incuriam, constitutionally infirm, and vitiated in law, having been recorded in clear disregard of binding Constitution Bench authority.
Point No. 2 :- Erroneous Declaration that Criminal Contempt Is Not an “Offence” and Denial of Article 20(3) Protection – Finding Per Incuriam.
This finding is manifestly unsustainable in law, as it has been recorded in complete disregard of authoritative pronouncements of Constitution Benches and larger Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which have consistently and unequivocally held that criminal contempt is a criminal offence in substance, and that all safeguards applicable to an accused in a criminal prosecution necessarily apply.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, inter alia, ruled in Hari Dass v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 1773; P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros., (2021) 6 SCC 258; National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600; Bloom v. State of Illinois, 1968 SCC OnLine US SC 93; A. Khan v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, (1993) 3 SCC 151; Khushi Ram v. Sheo Vati, (1953) 1 SCC 726; that proceedings for criminal contempt are penal in nature and fall within the meaning of an “offence” as understood under Section 41 of the IPC and general criminal jurisprudence.
It is specifically settled that an alleged contemnor in criminal contempt proceedings is entitled to all protections available to an accused in a criminal trial, including but not limited to:
· the fundamental presumption of innocence;
· the requirement that guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt;
· the right against self-incrimination guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution; and
· the right not to disclose the defence prematurely or at the threshold.
The burden of proof in criminal contempt proceedings rests squarely upon the complainant, the referring Judge, or the prosecution, to first establish the charge of contempt beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent cannot be compelled to disclose or set out his entire defence at the initiation stage. Silence on the part of the alleged contemnor cannot be treated as adverse or incriminating.
The alleged contemnor’s right is to confront, test, and demolish the prosecution case through cross-examination of witnesses and rebuttal evidence, rather than being forced to prematurely reveal his defence strategy. Compelling such disclosure would amount to forcing the respondent to be a witness against himself, which is constitutionally impermissible.
That, Full Bench in P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. Ispat (P) Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258, it is ruled as under;
“80. [….]
18. […] the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are quasi-criminal in nature and orders passed in those proceedings are to be treated as orders passed in criminal cases.
19. […] burden and standard of proof in contempt proceedings, being quasi-criminal in nature, is the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings, for the reason that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature.
27. In view of the above, the law can be summarised that the High Court has a power to initiate the contempt proceedings suo motu for ensuring the compliance with the orders passed by the Court. However, contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, the same standard of proof is required in the same manner as in other criminal cases. The alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of all safeguards/rights which are provided in the criminal jurisprudence, including the benefit of doubt. ”
In Clough Engineering Ltd., Australia v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, 2009 Cri. L.J. 2177, the Hon’ble Court authoritatively recognized that an alleged contemnor enjoys the full protection of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right against self-incrimination. It was expressly held that the Court cannot compel an alleged contemnor to answer questions that may be self-incriminating, and further, that no adverse inference can be drawn from the alleged contemnor’s silence.
It is ruled as under:
“19. Therefore, what we find that even though we have ample powers to find out a proper procedure for punishing the persons for committing the contempt of Court, yet the procedure which we invent shall not be contrary to Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
That, in National Fertilizers Ltd. V. Tuncay Alankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600, it is ruled that the contempt being quasi-criminal, the standard of proof is that of a criminal trial and the burden lies on the party alleging contempt; the charge cannot be made out merely on the basis of the contemnor’s reply, non-reply, or even a false reply—there must be independent, affirmative evidence proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
That, in High Court of Karnataka v. Jai Chaitanya Dasa, 2015 SCC OnLine Kar 549, it is ruled as under;
“In a criminal case the accused has the benefit of presumption of innocence and an opportunity of demolishing the prosecution case without exposing himself to cross-examination. In cases of criminal contempt, the standard of proof has to be that of criminal case, i.e., charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt. A person should not be convicted unless his conviction is essential in the interests of justice.
In Achhar Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 543, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that it is a foundational principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The “right of silence” guaranteed under Article 20(3) of the Constitution is an intrinsic facet of this presumption of innocence. A person accused of an offence is therefore deemed innocent during the entire interregnum between accusation and final adjudication.
Similar is the law laid down in:- Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC1.
Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rangammal v. Kuppuswami, AIR 2011 SC 2344, ruled as under:
“Since the High Court has misplaced the burden of proof, it clearly vitiated its own judgment as also those of the courts below, since it is a well-established dictum of the Evidence Act that misplacing the burden of proof vitiates the judgment.”
By misplacing the burden of proof upon the alleged contemnor and by denying him the constitutional and statutory safeguards applicable to an accused in a criminal proceeding, the impugned judgment stands vitiated and is rendered per incuriam, unconstitutional, and unenforceable.
In State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85, the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively ruled that a Court is duty-bound to apply the correct and settled law on its own motion, without waiting for any objection or submission to be raised by the parties. The Court recognised that it is the solemn constitutional obligation of every judicial forum to apply binding precedent suo motu. It was further held that any order passed in disregard of or contrary to binding judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court stands vitiated in law.
The three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 574, authoritatively declared that every interpretation rendered by the Supreme Court constitutes “law declared” within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. All courts, tribunals, judicial officers, and public authorities are constitutionally duty-bound not only to faithfully follow such law, but also to ensure that no order, direction, or decision passed by them creates ambiguity, confusion, dilution, or conflict with the law already declared by the Supreme Court. It was emphasised that every authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power must implement the directions and commands of the Supreme Court in their true letter and spirit, without selective application, cosmetic compliance, or indirect circumvention.
In Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane, (1989) 3 SCC 396, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that judgments of superior courts and tribunals must be rendered only after deep judicial travail and with a positive vein of certainty. The Court cautioned that a decision should never be allowed to pass unless the judge is absolutely sure of its correctness, and that the law must be made clear, certain, consistent, and predictable, as inconsistency in judicial decisions erodes the rule of law.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Medical Council of India v. G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust, (2018) 12 SCC 564, while passing strictures against a Division Bench of the High Court, categorically held that judges and decision-making authorities cannot substitute personal notions, individual philosophies, or subjective preferences for binding precedent. The Court observed that a judge is not a knight-errant roaming at will, nor can judicial decisions be driven by the notion that “what pleases the Prince has the force of law.” Discretion, where it exists, is a duty-bound power to further justice and legality, not a licence for arbitrariness. Any departure from binding precedent was held to amount to judicial indiscipline and constitutional impropriety.
Further, in C.N. Rudramurthy, (1998) 8 SCC 275, and M/s S.E. Graphites Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 984, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the settled doctrine that where a larger Bench of the Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted a statutory provision or settled a legal issue, any contrary or inconsistent view taken earlier or later by a smaller Bench stands impliedly overruled, even if such overruling is not expressly stated.
Taken cumulatively, these judgments establish that failure to apply binding Constitution Bench or larger Bench law, reliance on overruled precedents, or adoption of views contrary to settled Supreme Court jurisprudence vitiates the decision itself and renders it legally unsustainable under Articles 14 and 141 of the Constitution of India.
