Accepts Supreme Court’s Davinder Pal Precedent After Earlier Refusing to Follow It and Threatening Advocates With Contempt
In a significant turn of events, Justice Revathi Mohite Dere has recused herself from a matter argued by advocates who are simultaneously pursuing her criminal prosecution. This marks a reversal from her earlier stance, where she declined to follow the binding Supreme Court ruling in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770,and allegedly threatened advocates with contempt when they raised legitimate objections regarding bias and conflict of interest.
The Supreme Court, in Bhullar’s case and in P.K. Ghosh v. J.G. Rajput, (1995) 6 SCC 744, and Chetak Construction Ltd. v. Om Prakash, (1998) 4 SCC 577, has clearly ruled that it is right of every litigant and advocates to seek recusal of a judge when there exists reasonable apprehension of bias and Judge should not wait till the objections by the parties and he/she must recuse from the case to avoid embarrassing situation for the Judge and the advocates both. It is further ruled that seeking recusal does not amount to contempt and the Judge who threatens litigants or advocates with contempt action to silence reasonable recusal requests undermines the rule of law and such conduct warrants strong censure. The Court has repeatedly held that a judge must step aside where a reasonable person can perceive an appearance of bias, even in the absence of actual prejudice.
This principle of bias and recusal is well settled in :- High Court of Karnataka v. Jai Chaitanya Dasa, 2015 SCC OnLine Kar 549; Gullapalli Nageshwara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 319; Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1960) 2 SCR 609; Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 808; A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262; National Human Rights Commission v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2009) 6 SCC 767, State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna, (2001) 2 SCC 330,
Mumbai :-
The recusal order dated 17.11.2025 passed by Justice Revathi Mohite Dere marks a significant shift in approach, particularly because the same judge had earlier declined to follow the binding Supreme Court ruling in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770, and had continued hearing matters involving advocates against whom she was reasonably perceived to harbour personal bias—going so far as to issue threats of contempt when legitimate objections were raised. After sustained and intense criticism from the public, the legal fraternity, Bar members, and litigants, Justice Dere has now accepted the Supreme Court’s settled principles on recusal and stepped aside from the case.
In sharp contrast, another Judge of the Bombay High Court—Justice A.S. Gadkari—has demonstrated fairness, propriety, and strict adherence to judicial ethics. Acknowledging the principles of natural justice and the appearance of bias, Justice Gadkari suo motu passed multiple recusal orders in matters where advocates have sought compensation for the orders of the very Five-Judge Bench—of which he himself was a member—orders alleged to have violated the fundamental rights of those advocates. His proactive recusal in these writ petitions, including Ishwarlal Agarwal v. State, Criminal Writ Petition No. 5281 of 2025, has been widely appreciated by the legal fraternity and the public at large, as it exemplifies judicial integrity and faithful adherence to the Supreme Court’s binding jurisprudence on impartiality and conflict of interest.
The Recusal Order dated 17.11.2025 :
In Family Court Appeal No. 197 of 2015, the judge directed the Registry not to place the matter before any Bench of which she is a member.
The order was passed following a written pursis filed by the Petitioner pointing out:
• Their counsel, including Adv. Partho Sarkar and Adv. Vijay Kurle, are pursuing PIL No. 6900 of 2025, seeking criminal prosecution of Justice Dere.
• Justice Dere had written a private letter dated 04.04.2025 to the Chief Justice regarding a press conference of Adv. Nilesh Ojha—an issue now pending before a Five-Judge Bench.
When the matter was taken up, Adv. Partho Sarkar reiterated this legal position citing the binding Supreme Court law on bias and conflict of interest. Justice Dere accepted the objection and recused.
The order is passed in response to the written submission (Pursis) submitted by the petitioner stating that their counsels including advocates Partho Sarkar, Vijay kurle, are persuing the PIL No. 6900 of 2025 where criminal prosecution is sought against Justice Dere and also the fact that Justice Dere had written a private letter to the Chief Justice on 04.04.2025 regarding the press conference held by Adv. Nilesh Ojha and the matter is now being heard by the Five Judge bench.
The PIL seeking criminal prosecution of Justice Dere raises extremely serious allegations, the first being forgery in the Chanda Kochhar bail order. It is alleged that in Criminal Writ Petition (St.) No. 22494/2022, Justice Dere deliberately misrepresented the legal position by recording that Section 409 IPC carries a maximum punishment of only seven years, whereas the provision actually prescribes life imprisonment. This mischaracterisation allegedly enabled the case to be brought within the ratio of Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar. It is further alleged that she failed to consider and record the findings of the Special CBI Court, in clear violation of the binding directions laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Pratap Yadav v. Mitra Sen Yadav, which mandate that the High Court must take into account the order of the Sessions Court before taking a contrary view.
The second allegation concerns forgery in the grant of bail to NCP MLA Dilip Mohite in ABA No. 1621 of 2019, where Justice Dere is alleged to have suppressed the earlier order dated 19.07.2019 invoking Section 307 IPC and referring to evidence showing a conspiracy to kill a police officer and attack a police station. The PIL asserts that such suppression amounts to judicial dishonesty and fraud on power, squarely attracting the principles laid down in Vijay Shekhar v. Union of India, Muzaffar Husain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, and Kamisetty Pedda v. Chinna Kummagandla. To date, Justice Dere has offered no explanation or counter-evidence to refute or clarify any of these grave and well-documented allegations.
The Applicant, in their Pursis, clearly stated that under the binding law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Justice Revathi Mohite Dere stood disqualified from hearing the matter on account of natural bias and conflict of interest. When the case was taken up on 17.11.2025, Adv. Partho Sarkar reiterated this factual and legal position before the Court. Justice Dere accepted the objection and accordingly passed an order of recusal. The Supreme Court, in its authoritative judgment in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, (2011) 14 SCC 770, has categorically held that even the appearance of bias—not actual bias—is sufficient to vitiate any judicial order. The Court emphasized that while proof of actual prejudice may strengthen the case, it is not required; what matters is the reasonableness of the apprehension of bias in the mind of a litigant. Once such reasonable apprehension exists, the resulting judgment or order is rendered a nullity, and the proceedings are coram non judice.
Significantly, when this issue was raised earlier, Justice Dere had refused to recuse and offered no reasons for disregarding binding Supreme Court precedents. Instead, she allegedly issued threats of contempt against the advocates who sought her recusal. Her conduct drew strong condemnation from Bar members, litigants, and legal commentators. As held by the Supreme Court in P.K. Ghosh v. J.G. Rajput, (1995) 6 SCC 744, and Chetak Construction Ltd. v. Om Prakash, (1998) 4 SCC 577, a judge who threatens contempt to silence legitimate pleas for recusal undermines the rule of law and such conduct deserves express censure.
The controversy surrounding her refusal to recuse was further intensified in the high-profile Disha Salian death case. Justice Dere had written a private letter dated 04.04.2025 asserting that allegations against her were false and seeking action against Adv. Nilesh Ojha. However, the very same allegations had already been rejected—on both administrative and judicial sides—by the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, after considering a detailed written complaint dated 18.04.2023 submitted by the Bombay Bar Association (BBA). Despite this, a Five-Judge Bench was constituted and contempt notices were issued.
In response, Adv. Nilesh Ojha filed a comprehensive reply on affidavit, placing on record documentary evidence demonstrating the falsity and suppression committed by Justice Dere, including the fact that her complaint had already been rejected at the highest judicial levels. The contempt matter is now sub jedice before the Supreme Court as Adv. Nilesh Ojha challenged the orders passed by the Bombay High Court.
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. A.P. State Road Transport Corpn. 1959 Supp (1) SCR 319, has ruled as under;
“ 30. The aforesaid decisions accept the fundamental principle of natural justice that in the case of quasi-judicial proceedings, the authority empowered to decide the dispute between opposing parties must be one without bias towards one side or other in the dispute.
It is also a matter of fundamental importance that a person interested in one party or the other should not, even formally, take part in the proceedings though in fact he does not influence the mind of the person, who finally decides the case. This is on the principle that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. The hearing given by the Secretary, Transport Department, certainly offends the said principle of natural justice and the proceeding and the hearing given, in violation of that principle, are bad.”
In State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna, (2001) 2 SCC 330, held as under:
“Bias is like a drop of poison in a cup of pure milk. It is enough to ruin it. The slightest bias would vitiate the whole action.”
In National Human Rights Commission v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (2009) 6 SCC 767, it is ruled as under;
“ Since the fair hearing requires an opportunity to preserve the process, it may be vitiated and violated by an over hasty stage-managed, tailored and partisan trial.
“In Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 2006 CriLJ 1694 it was observed as under:
lf the court acts contrary to the role it is expected to play; it will be destruction of the fundamental edifice on which the justice delivery system stands. People (or whose benefit the courts exist shall start doubting the efficacy of the system. “Justice must be rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: ‘The Judge was biased. The perception may be wrong about the Judge’s bias, but the Judge concerned must be careful to see that no such impression gains ground. Judges like Caesar’s wife should be above suspicion.
US Supreme Court in the case of Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 1987 SCC OnLine US SC 95, it is ruled as under;
“ A concern for actual prejudice in such circumstances misses the point, for what is at stake is the public perception of the integrity of our criminal justice system. “[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” Offutt, supra, 348 U.S., at 14, 75 S.Ct., at 13, and a prosecutor with conflicting loyalties presents the appearance of precisely the opposite. ”
It has also been recognized that the defendant in criminal contempt proceedings is entitled to a public trial before an unbiased judge. [ In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 75 ]
Three Judge Bench in Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., (2025) 7 SCC 545, ruled as under;
27. The principle of nemo judex causa sua found its origin in English law. In Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal [Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, (1852) 3 HLC 759 : 10 ER 301] , the House of Lords in a case concerning pecuniary interest observed that the rule against bias extends not only to actual bias but also to the appearance of bias. This principle was later extended to other forms of interest in R v. Sussex Justices [R v. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 KB 256] where it was held that “even a suspicion that there has been improper interference with the course of justice”, would lead to the vitiation of proceedings. Lord Hewart noted that it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. Lord Denning in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon [Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon, (1969) 1 QB 577 : (1968) 3 WLR 694 (CA)] noted that, “if right-minded, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision does not stand”. It was further held that: (Lannon case [Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon, (1969) 1 QB 577 : (1968) 3 WLR 694 (CA)] , QB p. 599)
“… there must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the Justice, or Chairman as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side at the expense of the other.”
